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About	  WMG	  Service	  Systems	  Group	  
	  
The	  Service	  Systems	  research	  group	  at	  WMG	  works	  in	  collaboration	  with	  large	  
organisations	  such	  as	  GlaxoSmithKline,	  Rolls-­‐Royce,	  BAE	  Systems,	  IBM,	  Ministry	  of	  
Defence	  as	  well	  as	  with	  SMEs	  researching	  into	  value	  constellations,	  new	  business	  
models	  and	  value-­‐creating	  service	  systems	  of	  people,	  product,	  service	  and	  
technology.	  
The	  group	  conducts	  research	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  solving	  real	  problems	  in	  practice	  (ie.	  
how	  and	  what	  do	  do),	  while	  also	  understanding	  theoretical	  abstractions	  from	  
research	  (ie.	  why)	  so	  that	  the	  knowledge	  results	  in	  high-­‐level	  publications	  necessary	  
for	  its	  transfer	  across	  sector	  and	  industry.	  This	  approach	  ensures	  that	  the	  knowledge	  
we	  create	  is	  relevant,	  impactful	  and	  grounded	  in	  research.	  
In	  particular,	  we	  pursue	  the	  knowledge	  of	  service	  systems	  for	  value	  co-­‐creation	  that	  
is	  replicable,	  scalable	  and	  transferable	  so	  that	  we	  can	  address	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
difficult	  challenges	  faced	  by	  businesses,	  markets	  and	  society.	  	  
	  
Research	  Streams	  	  
The	  WMG	  Service	  Systems	  research	  group	  conducts	  research	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  
solving	  real	  problems	  in	  practice,	  and	  also	  to	  create	  theoretical	  abstractions	  from	  or	  
research	  that	  is	  relevant	  and	  applicable	  across	  sector	  and	  industry,	  so	  that	  the	  
impact	  of	  our	  research	  is	  substantial.	  	  
The	  group	  currently	  conducts	  research	  under	  six	  broad	  themes:	  	  
• Contextualisation	  
• Dematerialisation	  
• Service	  Design	  	  
• Value	  and	  Business	  Models	  	  
• Visualisation	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1.	  Introduction	  	  
	  
More	  than	  three	  decades	  ago,	  Grether	  and	  Plott	  (1979)	  drew	  economists’	  attention	  
to	  an	  unsettling	  regularity	  reported	  by	  experimental	  psychologists	  (Lichtenstein	  and	  
Slovic,	   1971;	   Lindman,	   1971).	   The	   regularity	   in	   question	  –	   the	   ‘preference	   reversal	  
phenomenon’	  –	   took	   the	   following	   form.	  Two	   lotteries	  were	   constructed:	  a	   ‘$-­‐bet’	  
which	  offered	  a	  relatively	  high	  payoff	  with	  a	  probability	  well	  below	  0.5;	  and	  a	  ‘P-­‐bet’	  
which	   offered	   a	   considerably	   higher	   probability	   of	   a	   more	   modest	   payoff.	  
Participants	   in	   the	   experiment	  were	   asked	   to	   do	   three	   things:	   to	   place	   a	   certainty	  
equivalent	  value1	  upon	  the	  $-­‐bet;	  to	  place	  a	  certainty	  equivalent	  value	  upon	  the	  P-­‐
bet;	   and	   to	  make	   a	   straight	   choice	   between	   the	   two.	  Most	   conventional	   decision	  
theories	   suppose	   that	   an	   individual	  who	  prefers	  one	  bet	   to	   the	  other	  will	   pick	   the	  
preferred	  option	  when	  offered	  a	  choice	  between	  the	  two	  and	  will	  also	  place	  a	  higher	  
certainty	   equivalent	   value	   on	   whichever	   option	   he/she	   prefers.	   However,	  
Lichtenstein	  and	  Slovic	  reported	  that	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  their	  experimental	  
participants	   flouted	   this	   expectation	   by	   choosing	   the	   P-­‐bet	  while	   placing	   a	   strictly	  
higher	  value	  on	  the	  $-­‐bet.	  The	  opposite	  ‘anomaly’	  –	  choosing	  the	  $-­‐bet	  while	  placing	  
a	   higher	   value	   on	   the	   P-­‐bet	   –	   was	   rarely	   observed.	   It	   is	   this	   asymmetry	   which	  
constitutes	  the	  classic	  preference	  reversal	  (PR)	  pattern.	  
Grether	  and	  Plott	   (1979)	  had	   initially	   supposed	   that	   this	  phenomenon	  would	  
disappear	   –	   or	   at	   least,	   be	   greatly	   attenuated	   –	   if	   stronger	   incentives	   and	   stricter	  
experimental	   controls	   were	   deployed.	   But	   in	   fact	   the	   phenomenon	   persisted,	   and	  
many	   other	   experiments	   since	   that	   time	   have	   found	   this	   classic	   PR	   pattern	   of	  
behaviour	   to	   be	   easy	   to	   replicate	   and	   quite	   difficult	   to	   eliminate	   without	  
considerable	   effort	   and/or	   supplementary	   mechanisms	   –	   see	   the	   survey	   by	   Seidl	  
(2002).	  
At	   the	   level	   of	   modelling,	   this	   phenomenon	   would	   appear	   to	   present	   a	  
fundamental	   challenge	   to	   general	   theories	   that	   assume	   transitivity.	   At	   the	   level	   of	  
practical	  application,	  it	  raises	  concerns	  about	  the	  use	  of	  stated	  values	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  
guiding	   public	   policy:	   if	   such	   patterns	   also	   occur	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   (say)	  
                                                
1 Most often, this value has been elicited as a ‘reservation selling price’ – that is, the individual is given 
ownership of the bet and is asked to state the smallest sure amount for which he/she would be prepared 
to sell the right to play out the bet. Sometimes the task is framed in terms of the maximum sure sum the 
individual would be prepared to pay to buy the right to play the bet and be paid accordingly. 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) report experiments using both selling values and buying values. Luce 
(2000, chapters 6 and 7) provides a detailed theoretical discussion of buying and selling prices for risky 




environmental	  goods,	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  that	  using	  stated	  willingness-­‐to-­‐pay	  in	  cost-­‐
benefit	   analysis	   might	   lead	   to	   priority	   being	   given	   to	   projects	   that	   would	   not	   be	  
chosen	   if	   citizens	   were	   in	   a	   position	   to	   express	   choices	   or	   rankings	   directly.	   For	  
reasons	   of	   both	   theory	   and	   policy,	   therefore,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   gain	   a	   better	  
understanding	  of	  what	  this	  phenomenon	  really	  represents	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  structure	  
of	  human	  preferences	  and/or	  the	  validity	  of	  different	  procedures	  for	  eliciting	  those	  
preferences.	  
This	  paper	  aims	   to	   contribute	   to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	   those	   issues.	   The	  
next	   section	   discusses	   in	  more	   detail	   the	  main	   competing	   explanations	   of	   PR	   and	  
some	  of	  the	  evidence	  for	  and	  against	  the	  different	  accounts.	  That	  discussion	  raises	  
issues	  about	  the	  noisiness	  or	  imprecision	  of	  many	  people’s	  responses,	  so	  in	  Section	  3	  
we	   outline	   a	   (deliberately	   broad)	   framework	   of	   probabilistic	   preferences	   within	  
which	   our	   inquiry	   will	   be	   conducted.	   In	   Section	   4	   we	   report	   two	   substantial	  
experiments.	   The	   data	   generated	   by	   these	   experiments	   strongly	   suggest	   that	   for	  
pairs	   of	   bets	   typical	   of	   the	   PR	   literature,	   most	   people’s	   preferences	   exhibit	   some	  
degree	  of	  stochastic	  variability,	  but	  their	  ‘core’	  preferences	  mostly	  conform	  with	  the	  
probabilistic	   formulation	   of	   transitivity	   known	   as	  Weak	   Stochastic	   Transitivity.	   Put	  
another	   way,	   when	   certainty	   equivalent	   values	   are	   inferred	   from	   repeated	   binary	  
choices,	  the	  classic	  PR	  phenomenon	  largely	  disappears	  and	  the	  reversals	  that	  remain	  
are	   relatively	   few	   in	   number	   and	   small	   in	  magnitude.	   By	   contrast,	   when	   certainty	  
equivalent	   values	   are	   elicited	   more	   directly	   via	   a	   standard	   incentive-­‐compatible	  
mechanism,	  the	  same	  individuals	  display	  a	  very	  strong	  PR	  pattern	  of	  the	  usual	  kind.	  
Our	  results	  broadly	  support	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  by	  Tversky	  et	  al.	  (1990)	  and	  Bostic	  
et	   al.	   (1990),	   although	   we	   find	   ‘overvaluation’	   of	   all	   bets	   rather	   than	   the	   mix	   of	  
overvaluation	  and	  undervaluation	  that	  those	  studies	  report.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  reconcile	  the	  data	  with	  conventional	  deterministic	  models	  
–	   even	   those	   that	   permit	   some	   level	   of	   preference	   reversal	   (e.g.,	   Loomes	   and	  
Sugden,	  1983).	  So	  in	  Section	  5	  we	  explore	  the	  data	  we	  have	  generated	  to	  see	  if	  we	  
can	   shed	   further	   light	   on	   the	   disparities	   between	   choice	   and	   valuation	   and	   we	  
discuss	  whether	  we	  can	  account	  for	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  model	  of	  probabilistic	  choice	  
known	  as	  Decision	  Field	  Theory	  (Busemeyer	  and	  Townsend,	  1993).	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  
this	  model	  –	  at	  least,	  as	  applied	  by	  Johnson	  and	  Busemeyer	  (2005)	  –	  cannot	  readily	  
accommodate	  our	  data,	   so	   in	   the	   final	   section	  we	  discuss	  some	  possible	  directions	  
for	  future	  theoretical	  development	  and	  some	  implications	  for	  applied	  research.	  
	  
2.	  Different	  Possible	  Explanations	  of	  the	  Classic	  PR	  Pattern	  
Attempts	  to	  account	  for	  the	  PR	  phenomenon	  fall	  into	  three	  main	  categories,	  each	  of	  




2.1	  Intransitive	  Preferences	  
One	  possible	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern	  reflects	  preferences	  that	  allow	  
systematic	  intransitivity	  over	  binary	  choices.	  Let	  us	  write	  the	  $-­‐bet	  as	  $,	  write	  the	  P-­‐
bet	  as	  P,	  and	  denote	  strict	  preference	  by	  ≻ .	  Suppose	  we	  can	  find	  some	  sure	  amount	  
of	  money	  M	  such	   that	  an	   individual	  has	   the	  preferences	  $	   ≻M,	  M	   ≻ P	  and	  P	   ≻ $:	  
that	   is,	   suppose	   that	   for	   this	   particular	   {$,	   P,	   M}	   triple	   she	   has	   intransitive	  
preferences.	  	  
If	   asked	   to	   give	   her	   certainty	   equivalent	   for	   the	   $-­‐bet,	   CE($),	   she	   will	   state	  
some	  CE($)	  >	  M;	  and	  if	  asked	  to	  give	  her	  certainty	  equivalent	  for	  the	  P-­‐bet,	  she	  will	  
state	  CE(P)	  <	  M.	  Hence	  when	  asked	  to	  give	  the	  two	  valuations	  and	  also	  make	  a	  direct	  
choice	  between	  $	  and	  P,	  as	  in	  standard	  PR	  experiments,	  she	  will	  report	  CE($)	  >	  CE(P)	  
and	  P	   ≻ $,	  thereby	  exhibiting	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern.	  In	  so	  doing,	  there	  is	  no	  bias	  or	  
error	   in	  her	  responses:	  she	   is	  accurately	  reporting	  her	  preferences,	  but	  happens	  to	  
have	  preferences	  that,	  in	  this	  case,	  do	  not	  conform	  with	  transitivity.	  Although	  many	  
decision	   theories	   take	   transitivity	  as	  axiomatic,	  not	  all	   theories	  do	  so:	   for	  example,	  
Regret	   Theory	   (Bell,	   1982,	   Loomes	   and	   Sugden,	   1982,	   1983)	   allows	   preferences	   of	  
the	  kind	  that	  would	  produce	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern	  for	  at	  least	  some	  {$,	  P}	  pairs.2	  	  
Of	   course,	   if	   this	   intransitivity	   explanation	   is	   correct,	   it	   should	  be	  possible	   to	  
find	  evidence	  of	  the	  $	   ≻M,	  M	   ≻ P	  and	  P	   ≻ $	  cycles	  that	  would	  underpin	  the	  classic	  
PR	  pattern.	  A	  paper	  by	  Loomes	  et	  al.	   (1991)	   reported	  an	  experiment	  where	  choice	  
cycles	  in	  this	  classic	  direction	  did	  indeed	  outnumber	  those	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  
seemingly	   to	   a	   significant	   extent.	   However,	   only	   a	  minority	   of	   all	   responses	   were	  
cyclical	   and	   it	   was	   suggested	   by	   Sopher	   and	   Gigliotti	   (1993)	   that	   the	   patterns	  
reported	   by	   Loomes	   et	   al.	   (1991)	   could	   possibly	   have	   arisen	   purely	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
noise/error.	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  to	  which	  we	  shall	  return	  below.	  
2.2	  Procedural	  Biases	  
A	  rather	  different	  kind	  of	  explanation	  of	   the	  PR	  phenomenon	  was	  offered	  by	  
Lichtenstein	  and	  Slovic	   (1971).	  Other	  variants	  have	  been	  suggested	  since,	  but	  what	  
they	   have	   in	   common	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   people	   may	   not	   have	   highly	   articulated	  
underlying	   preferences	   which	   are	   always	   accurately	   and	   consistently	   expressed	   in	  
response	   to	   every	   task,	   but	   rather	  may	   to	   some	   extent	   construct	   their	   responses	  
according	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   task	   presented	   to	   them	   and	   may	   therefore	   be	  
systematically	  influenced	  by	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  different	  procedures	  used.	  	  
                                                
2 An intuitive explanation of how Regret Theory works in this context is as follows. An individual who 
behaves according to Regret Theory gives disproportionate weight to larger payoff differences within 
binary comparisons and is especially averse to being on the downside of such differences. In a {$, M} 
pair, the bigger difference is between the $-bet’s high payoff and the relatively modest sure sum 
offered by M and this works against M and favours choosing $. By contrast, in the {P, M} pair, the 
higher payoff offered by P is typically not much better than the sure sum while the more influential 
difference is between the sure sum and P’s lower payoff, which works against P and favours M. Hence 




So,	   for	   example,	   when	   asked	   to	   give	   a	   certainty	   equivalent	   –	   that	   is,	   when	  
asked	  to	  give	  a	  response	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  –	  it	  may	  be	  that	  individuals	  are	  
(subconsciously)	   prompted	   to	   pay	   extra	   attention	   to	   the	   money	   dimension	   and	  
underweight	   the	   probability	   information.	   Perhaps	   –	   especially	   when	   the	   task	   is	  
framed	  as	  selling	  –	  they	  initially	  ‘anchor’	  on	  the	  bet’s	  most	  desirable	  payoff	  and	  then	  
arrive	   at	   their	   valuation	   by	   adjusting	   down	   from	   that	   payoff	   to	   allow	   for	   the	  
possibility	  that	  some	  lower	  payoff	  may	  result;	  but	  they	  do	  not	  adjust	  sufficiently	  and	  
hence	   tend	   to	   generate	   a	   higher	   certainty	   equivalent	   for	   the	   bet	   with	   the	   higher	  
payoff,	   namely	   the	   $-­‐bet.	   By	   contrast,	   when	   asked	   to	   make	   a	   straight	   choice	  
between	  $	  and	  P,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  more	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  chances	  of	  winning	  at	  
least	   something;	   and	   since	   the	   P-­‐bet	   offers	   a	   bigger	   chance	   of	  winning	   something	  
than	  the	  $-­‐bet,	  this	  serves	  to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  P-­‐bet	  will	  be	  chosen.	  In	  
short,	  the	  weight	  given	  to	  different	  dimensions	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  elicitation	  procedure,	  resulting	  in	  a	  systematic	  disparity	  between	  the	  preference	  
inferred	   from	   direct	   choice	   and	   the	   preference	   inferred	   from	   the	   two	   separate	  
valuations.	  
Tversky	  et	  al.	  (1990)	  conducted	  some	  experiments	  intended	  to	  try	  to	  diagnose	  
the	   causes	   of	   preference	   reversals,	   both	   for	   risky	   options	   and	   for	   intertemporal	  
decisions.	  With	   respect	   to	   $-­‐bets	   and	  P-­‐bets	   (which	   they	   relabelled	   L	   and	  H),	   they	  
concluded	   that	   the	   phenomenon	   was	   primarily	   due	   to	   what	   they	   regarded	   as	  
overvaluing	  the	  L	  ($)	  bet,	  partly	  due	  to	  undervaluing	  the	  H	  (P)	  bet,	  with	  perhaps	  5%-­‐
10%	  of	  the	  effect	  due	  to	  intransitivity.	  
However,	   there	  are	  reasons	  to	  be	  cautious	  about	   the	  basis	   for	   this	  diagnosis.	  
One	   reservation	   concerns	   the	   mechanism	   used	   to	   elicit	   the	   values	   of	   the	   bets.	  
Participants	  were	  told	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  any	  session	  involving	  real	  payoffs,	  a	  pair	  of	  
lotteries	   would	   be	   selected	   at	   random.	   There	   was	   then	   a	   50%	   chance	   that	   a	  
participant	  would	  be	  paid	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  playing	  out	  whichever	  option	  he	  had	  picked	  
in	  the	  direct	  choice	  task;	  and	  there	  was	  a	  50%	  chance	  that	  he	  would	  instead	  play	  out	  
whichever	   option	   he	   had	   placed	   a	   higher	   value	   upon.	  While	   Tversky	   et	   al.	   (1990,	  
p.207)	  argued	  that	  this	  “ordinal	  payoff	  scheme”	  avoided	  some	  of	  the	  objections	  that	  
had	  been	  made	  against	  the	  standard	  Becker-­‐DeGroot-­‐Marschak	  (1964)	  mechanism,	  
it	   had	   the	   disadvantage	   that	   it	   was	   no	   longer	   necessary	   to	   identify	   the	   true	  
indifference	  value	   for	  each	  bet,	   since	   it	  was	  only	   the	  ordering	  of	   the	  values	   rather	  
than	   their	   precise	   magnitudes	   that	   mattered.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   mechanism	  
designed	   to	   give	   accurate	  magnitudes,	   it	   is	   arguably	   unsafe	   to	   make	   statements	  
about	  ‘overvaluing’	  or	  ‘undervaluing’	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ordinal	  responses.	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   one	   can	   detect	   intransitivity	   depends	   on	  
whether	   the	   parameters	   selected	   by	   the	   experimenters	   happen	   to	   fall	   within	   a	  
participant’s	   ‘critical’	   region	   (since	   Regret	   Theory,	   for	   example,	   does	   not	   entail	  




intransitive	  over	   some	   range).	   So	  an	  experiment	  which	  uses	   a	   small	   set	  of	  options	  
involving	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   pre-­‐set	   parameters	   may	   well	   hit	   upon	   the	   critical	  
region	   for	   some	   individuals	   but	  might	  miss	   it	   for	   others	   with	   different	   underlying	  
preferences,	   even	   though	   these	   people	   might	   display	   intransitivity	   in	   other	  
(unexplored)	  triples.	  	  
The	  studies	  conducted	  by	  Bostic	  et	  al.	   (1990)	  tried	  to	  address	  the	   latter	   issue	  
by	   eliciting	   choices	   via	   two	   different	   iterative	   procedures	   (while	   using	   the	   Becker-­‐
DeGroot-­‐Marschak	   mechanism	   to	   incentivise	   valuations	   elicited	   in	   a	   more	  
conventional	   way).	   Bostic	   et	   al.	   (1990)	   found	   that	   their	   first	   iterative	   choice	  
experiment	  reduced	  the	  prevalence	  of	  cycles	  compared	  with	  classic	  PR	  patterns	  but	  
did	  not	  eliminate	   the	  asymmetries	  between	  cycles	   for	   two	   {$,	  P}	  pairs	  out	  of	   four.	  
Their	   second	   experiment,	   using	   a	   more	   concealed	   iterative	   choice	   procedure3,	  
seemed	   to	   reduce	   the	   significance	   of	   asymmetrical	   cycles	   even	   further,	   but	   had	   a	  
rather	  small	  sample	  of	  just	  21	  respondents.	  	  	  	  
2.3	  Imprecise	  or	  Probabilistic	  Preferences	  
There	  is	  a	  third	  kind	  of	  explanation	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  possible	  importance	  of	  
the	  imprecise	  or	  probabilistic	  nature	  of	  many	  people’s	  preferences.	  	  
At	  the	  less	  structured	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  of	  such	  accounts,	  MacCrimmon	  and	  
Smith	  (1986)	  suggested	  that	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern	  could	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
$-­‐bet	  allowing	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  valuation	  responses	  that	  do	  not	  violate	   first-­‐
order	  stochastic	  dominance	  than	  the	  range	  allowed	  by	  the	  P-­‐bet,	  so	  that	  individuals	  
who	   were	   unsure	   about	   their	   precise	   certainty	   equivalent	   could	   more	   easily	   pick	  
higher	  values	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet	  than	  for	  the	  P-­‐bet	  without	  being	  obviously	  wrong.	  If	  both	  
bets	  have	  (roughly)	  the	  same	  minimum	  payoff	  (small	  negative	  amounts	  in	  the	  early	  
experiments,	  often	  zero	  in	  more	  recent	  experiments),	  there	  is	  more	  scope	  for	  giving	  
higher	  values	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet	  than	  for	  the	  P-­‐bet	  but	  less	  scope	  for	  giving	  lower	  values,	  
which	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  produce	  the	  classic	  asymmetry.	  
MacCrimmon	  and	  Smith	  (1986)	  noted	  that	  if	  the	  same	  reasoning	  were	  applied	  
to	  the	  elicitation	  of	  probability	  equivalents,	  the	  opposite	  asymmetry	  might	  be	  
expected.4	  Butler	  and	  Loomes	  (2007)	  conducted	  an	  experiment	  to	  explore	  these	  
                                                
3 Bostic et al. (1990, p.204) expressed some concern that in their first experiment, the iterative 
procedure may have become so transparent that it affected respondents’ answers by putting them into a 
valuation frame of mind. Experimental economists might also fear that a transparent procedure could 
encourage strategic answers intended to influence the options offered subsequently. The second 
procedure used by Bostic et al. (1990), was less transparent and therefore less vulnerable to those 
concerns.  
4 Instead of asking for a sure amount of money that the individual considers exactly as desirable as a 
particular bet, these questions ask the individual to state the probability of an even higher payoff that is 
regarded as equivalent to a particular bet. For example, if the P-bet were a 0.7 chance of £15 and a 0.3 
chance of 0, an individual might be asked what probability p of £60 (with a 1-p chance of 0) would be 
exactly as desirable as that P-bet; and might also be asked what probability q of £60 (otherwise 0) 




possibilities	  and	  found	  some	  evidence	  that	  people’s	  uncertainty	  about	  their	  own	  
preferences	  varied	  in	  ways	  consistent	  with	  MacCrimmon	  and	  Smith’s	  conjectures.	  
At	  the	  more	  structured	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  Blavatskyy	  (2009)	  has	  proposed	  a	  
model	   which	   embeds	   a	   deterministic	   Expected	   Utility	   Theory	   (EUT)	   core	   in	   a	  
particular	  stochastic	  specification	  and	  has	  shown	  how	  some	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  classic	  
PR	  direction	  might	  result.	  The	  detail	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  different	  from	  that	  used	  by	  
Sopher	  and	  Gigliotti	  (1993)	  mentioned	  above,	  but	  the	  general	  proposition	  is	  similar:	  
namely,	   that	   if	   an	   individual’s	   expressed	   preferences	   involve	   some	   stochastic	  
component,	   that	   component,	   although	   itself	   random,	   may	   interact	   with	   core	  
preferences	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   produce	   seemingly	   systematic	   departures	   from	  
standard	   presumptions.	   Under	   certain	   conditions,	   this	   model	   can	   even	  
accommodate	  what	  Fishburn	  (1988,	  pp.	  45-­‐46)	  called	  ‘strong’	  reversals.5	  
Johnson	   and	   Busemeyer	   (2005)	   explored	   the	   possibility	   that	   Busemeyer	   and	  
Townsend’s	  (1993)	  Decision	  Field	  Theory	  might	  provide	  an	  explanation.	  The	  key	  idea	  
is	  that	  individuals	  arrive	  at	  a	  valuation	  response	  after	  a	  cognitive	  process	  of	  iteration	  
between	  each	  bet	  and	  some	  sequence	  of	  sure	  amounts.	  They	  hypothesised	  that	  the	  
starting	  point	  of	  such	  a	  process	  typically	  involved	  higher	  sure	  amounts	  when	  $-­‐bets	  
were	  being	  valued	  than	  when	  P-­‐bets	  were	  being	  processed	  and	  that	  it	  was	  this	  that	  
tended	  to	  produce	  CE($)	  >  CE(P)	  even	  when	  P	  ≻ $	  in	  a	  direct	  comparison.	  	  
In	   Section	  5,	  we	  will	   discuss	   this	   and	   the	   various	  other	  possible	   explanations	  
outlined	  above.	  First,	  however,	  we	  set	  the	  scene	  for	  our	  experiments.	  	  
	  
3.	  A	  Broad	  Probabilistic	  Choice	  Framework	  
It	   has	   often	   been	  observed	   that	  when	   the	   same	   individual	   is	   presented	  with	  
exactly	  the	  same	  tasks	  framed	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  on	  more	  than	  one	  occasion	  
within	  a	   fairly	  short	  period	  of	   time,	  he/she	  may	  answer	  somewhat	  differently	   in	  at	  
least	   some	   of	   those	   repetitions.	   An	   early	   manifestation	   of	   such	   behaviour	   was	  
reported	   by	  Mosteller	   and	  Nogee	   (1951),	  who	   encountered	   variability	   of	   this	   kind	  
when	  they	  presented	  respondents	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  choices,	  each	  repeated	  multiple	  
times	   over	   a	   period	   of	   several	   weeks.	   For	   example,	   one	   series	   of	   decisions	   asked	  
respondents	  either	  to	  accept	  or	  refuse	  a	  gamble	  that	  involved	  a	  ⅓	  chance	  of	   losing	  
5c	  and	  a	  ⅔	  chance	  of	  winning	  X,	  where	  X	  took	  a	  number	  of	  different	  values	  ranging	  
from	  5c	  through	  7c,	  9c,	  10c,	  11c,	  12c	  to	  16c.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment,	  each	  
                                                                                                                                       
range between 0 and 0.7 without violating dominance while q is constrained by dominance to lie 
between 0 and 0.3, there is more scope to give a higher probability equivalent for the P-bet while 
perhaps choosing the $-bet in the direct choice between the two.  
5 A ‘strong’ reversal is a case where the P-bet is chosen even though the stated certainty equivalent for 
the $-bet is strictly higher than the maximum payoff offered by the P-bet. Thus it amounts to an 
implicit violation of first-order stochastic dominance. Even though Regret Theory allows ‘standard’ 




level	   of	   X	  was	   presented	   to	   each	   respondent	   on	   up	   to	   14	   independent	   occasions.	  
Mosteller	  and	  Nogee	  (1951,	  Figure	  2)	  depicted	  a	  respondent	  who	  never	  accepted	  the	  
gamble	   when	   X	   was	   5c	   or	   7c	   and	   always	   played	   it	   when	   X	   was	   16c,	   but	   for	  
intermediate	   values	   his	   acceptance	   rate	   lay	   between	   7%	   and	   93%,	   increasing	  
monotonically	   with	   X.	   Such	   variability	   (although	   often	   less	   neatly	  monotonic)	   was	  
typical	   of	   the	   other	   participants	   in	   their	   study	   –	   and	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   many	  
subsequent	  studies	  involving	  repeated	  choices.	  	  
Over	   the	   years,	   such	   variability	   has	   been	   formally	   modelled	   in	   a	   number	   of	  
ways	  –	  see	  Luce	  and	  Suppes	  (1965)	  for	  an	  early	  review	  and	  Rieskamp	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  for	  
a	  more	   recent	   one.	  However,	   as	   Stott	   (2006)	   and	  Blavatskyy	   and	   Pogrebna	   (2010)	  
have	   shown,	   different	   assumptions	   about	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   stochastic	  
component	   is	   specified	   can	   produce	   quite	   different	   estimates	   of	   underlying	  
parameters.	   So	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   becoming	   embroiled	   in	   debates	   about	   the	  
sensitivity	  of	  our	  results	  to	  particular	  functional	  forms,	  our	  strategy	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  
try	  to	  investigate	  the	  issues	  raised	  above	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  probabilistic	  choice	  
so	  general	  that	  it	  encompasses	  a	  very	  broad	  range	  of	  more	  specific	  stochastic	  models	  
and	  relies	  on	  a	  bare	  minimum	  of	  assumptions.	  	  
Consider	   a	   case	   where	   an	   individual	   is	   presented	   with	   a	   number	   of	   choices	  
between	   some	   lottery	  B	   and	   a	   series	   of	   increasing	   sure	   amounts	  denoted	  by	  Aj.	   If	  
these	   choices	   could	   be	   presented	   on	   a	   number	   of	   different	   occasions	   and	   under	  
circumstances	  where	  an	  individual	  makes	  each	  choice	  independently	  of	  every	  other	  
one	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  remembering	  previous	  choices	  and	  therefore	  making	  each	  
new	  choice	  afresh	  –	  then	  we	  might	  model	  an	  individual’s	  underlying	  preferences	  as	  a	  
probability	  distribution.	  
Figure	   1	   shows	   two	   possible	   distributions.	   The	   dashed	   line	   shows	   the	  
deterministic	  preferences	  of	  an	   individual	  who	   is	   indifferent	  between	  B	  and	  a	   sure	  
amount	  A6:	  for	  all	  j	  <	  6,	  she	  always	  chooses	  B	  and	  for	  all	  j	  >	  6	  she	  never	  chooses	  B,	  
while	  for	  j	  =	  6,	  all	  probability	  mixes	  of	  A	  and	  B	  are	  equally	  good.	  	  
The	   solid	   curve	   shows	   the	   underlying	   distribution	   for	   an	   individual	   with	  
probabilistic	  preferences.	  In	  this	  example,	  when	  the	  sure	  thing	  is	   less	  than	  or	  equal	  
to	  A3,	   the	   individual	  always	  chooses	  B;	  whereas	  when	  the	  sure	   thing	   is	  equal	   to	  or	  
greater	  than	  A10,	  he	  never	  chooses	  B.	  But	  for	  values	  of	  A	  between	  A3	  and	  A10	  there	  is	  
some	  chance	  that	  either	  A	  or	  B	  might	  be	  chosen.	  For	  example,	  when	  presented	  with	  
a	  choice	  between	  B	  and	  A5,	   there	   is	  a	  0.77	  chance	  he	  will	  choose	  B;	  so	   if	  he	  made	  
that	  choice	  100	  times	  on	  separate	  and	  independent	  occasions,	  we	  would	  expect	  on	  
average	   to	   observe	   him	   choosing	   the	   sure	   amount	   on	   23	   of	   those	   occasions.	  
Increasing	  the	  sure	  amount	  to	  A8	   increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  sure	  sum	  will	  be	  
chosen	  –	  to	  0.93	  –	  but	  in	  100	  repetitions	  of	  the	  choice	  we	  would	  still	  expect	  B	  to	  be	  




Figure	  1:	  Deterministic	  and	  Probabilistic	  Preferences	  
 
Using	  Pr(A≻ B)	  to	  denote	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  A	  from	  the	  pair	  {A,	  B},	  we	  
shall	   refer	   to	   cases	   where	   Pr(A≻ B)	   =	   Pr(B≻A)	   =	   0.5	   as	   cases	   of	   stochastic	  
indifference	   (SI).	   This	   is	   the	   stochastic	   analogue	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   certainty	  
equivalence	  in	  deterministic	  theories.	  In	  the	  example	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1,	  the	  SI	  point	  
is	  at	  A6.	  
The	  curve	   in	  Figure	  1	   is	  no	  more	   than	  an	   illustration	  and	  we	  make	  no	  strong	  
claims	  about	  its	  shape.	  We	  have	  drawn	  it	  as	  sigmoid	  because	  that	  seems	  to	  fit	  many	  
intuitions	   and	   datasets.	   We	   leave	   open	   the	   question	   of	   symmetry:	   some	   model	  
specifications	   may	   imply	   symmetry	   while	   others	   may	   suggest	   particular	   kinds	   of	  
asymmetry,	  but	  such	  detail	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  our	  purposes.	  All	  we	  wish	  to	  convey	  
in	  Figure	  1	  is	  the	  distinction	  between	  deterministic	  and	  probabilistic	  choice	  and	  the	  
broad	  proposition	  that	  models	  of	  probabilistic	  choice	  allow	  there	  to	  be	  some	  range	  
between	  the	  point	  where	  B	  is	  always	  chosen	  and	  the	  point	  where	  B	  is	  never	  chosen6,	  
and	  that	  between	  those	  two	  points	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  B	  falls	  monotonically	  
as	  A	  becomes	  unambiguously	  better.	  	  
Now	  let	  us	  consider	  two	  different	  lotteries	  represented	  on	  the	  same	  diagram.	  	  
In	   Figure	   2,	   let	   the	   dashed	   curve	   represent	   the	   distribution	   for	   a	   particular	   P-­‐bet	  
while	  the	  solid	  curve	  shows	  the	  distribution	  for	  a	  particular	  $-­‐bet,	  where	  Pr($≻ P)	  =	  
Pr(P	  ≻ $)	  =	  0.5	  and	  where	  both	  of	  these	  bets	  are	  stochastically	  indifferent	  to	  the	  sure	  
amount	   A6.	   Thus	   we	   have	   constructed	   a	   case	   which	   is	   consistent	   with	   Weak	  
Stochastic	  Transitivity	  (WST),	  which,	  for	  any	  triple	  {X,	  Y,	  Z},	  requires	  that	  if	  Pr(X≻ Y)	  ≥	  
0.5	  and	  Pr(Y≻ Z)	  ≥	  0.5,	  then	  Pr(X≻ Z)	  ≥	  0.5.	  
                                                
6 Here we are abstracting from what have come to be called ‘trembles’ – that is, cases where a 
transparently inferior option is chosen, perhaps due to some lapse of attention. For example, in cases 
where one option transparently dominates the other, it has been observed that the dominated alternative 





However,	  even	  when	  WST	  holds,	  patterns	  of	  choice	  over	  specific	  pairs	  located	  
away	   from	   the	   SI	   points	  may	   exhibit	  what	   looks	   like	   systematic	   disparities.	   To	   see	  
this,	  suppose	  that	  we	  have	  a	  sample	  of	  100	  individuals	  whose	  preferences	  are	  each	  
as	  in	  Figure	  2.	  Instead	  of	  asking	  them	  to	  choose	  between	  pairs	  involving	  A6,	  suppose	  
we	  set	  the	  sure	  amount	  at	  A8.	  	  
Each	   participant	   is	   assumed	   to	   make	   each	   choice	   as	   if	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
independent	   draws	   from	   the	   underlying	   distributions	   in	   Figure	   2.	   Most	   will	   give	  
responses	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  transitive	  orderings	  over	  {$,	  P,	  A8},	  but	  there	  will	  
be	  some	  sets	  of	  choices	  that	  are	  intransitive,	  either	  in	  the	  direction	  consistent	  with	  
the	  classic	  PR	  or	  else	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  	  
The	  cycle	  corresponding	  with	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern	   is	  $≻ A8,	  A8≻ P	  and	  P≻ $.	  
From	  Figure	  2	  we	   read	  off	  Pr($≻ A8)	  =	  0.27	  and	  Pr(A8≻ P)	  =	  0.93.	  Combining	   these	  
probabilities	  with	   Pr(P≻ $)	   =	   0.5	   and	   assuming	   independent	   draws,	   the	   product	   of	  
these	  probabilities	  is	  0.12555,	  so	  that	  on	  average	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  observe	  12	  or	  
13	  members	  of	  our	  sample	  exhibiting	  the	  cycle	  consistent	  with	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern.	  
The	  opposite	   cycle	   involves	   $≻ P,	   P≻ A8	   and	  A8≻ $,	   for	  which	   the	  probabilities	   are	  
0.5,	   0.07	   and	   0.73,	   giving	   a	   product	   of	   0.02555,	   so	   that	   we	   should	   expect	   2	   or	   3	  
people	  to	  report	  this	  pattern.	  Even	  if	  we	  round	  the	  first	  number	  down	  and	  round	  the	  
second	  number	  up,	  we	  have	  a	  12:3	  ratio	  between	  the	  two	  cycles.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  apply	  
the	  standard	  binomial	   test,	   in	  effect,	   testing	   the	  null	  hypothesis	   that	  both	   types	  of	  
cycle	  are	  equally	  likely,	  we	  should	  reject	  that	  hypothesis	  at	  the	  5%	  level.	  Thus	  we	  can	  
see	   how	   probabilistic	   preferences	   which	   respect	   transitivity	   at	   the	   core	   may	  
nevertheless	   give	   the	   appearance	   of	   systematic	   asymmetries	   in	   responses	   to	   a	  
particular	  set	  of	  predetermined	  options. 






How	   might	   we	   depict	   probabilistic	   preferences	   which	   do	   not	   respect	   WST?	  
Suppose	  we	  could	  find	  a	  {$,	  P}	  pair	  such	  that	  Pr(P≻ $)	  >	  0.5	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
the	  underlying	  probability	  distributions	  for	  each	  bet	  against	  different	  sure	  sums	  is	  as	  
in	  Figure	  3.	  
Figure	  3:	  $-­‐bet	  SI	  >	  P-­‐bet	  SI	  
 
	  
As	  in	  Figure	  2,	  the	  dashed	  curve	  represents	  the	  {Aj	  ,P}	  relationship	  while	  the	  
solid	  curve	  shows	  {Aj	  ,$}.	  Here	  the	  SI	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet	  is	  A7	  while	  the	  SI	  for	  the	  P-­‐bet	  is	  
A6.	  So	   if	  we	  set	  the	  sure	  sum	  between	  A6	  and	  A7	  –	  half	  way	  between,	  for	  example,	  
which	  we	  denote	  by	  A*	  –	  then	  we	  should	  see	  WST	  violated	  because	  at	  that	  level	  of	  
A,	   Pr($≻ A*)	   =	   0.58	   while	   Pr(A*≻ P)	   =	   0.65,	   which	   should	   imply	   Pr($≻ P)	   ≥	   0.5,	  
whereas	  we	  have	  a	  {$,	  P}	  pair	  such	  that	  Pr($≻ P)	  <	  0.5.	  
Notice,	  however,	  that	  such	  a	  violation	  of	  WST	  is	  only	  observable	  for	  A	  between	  
A6	  and	  A7.	  	  If	  we	  were	  to	  set	  the	  sure	  sum	  at	  anything	  less	  than	  A6,	  both	  Pr($≻A)	  and	  
Pr(P≻ A)	  >	  0.5	  so	  that	  no	  violation	  of	  WST	  can	  be	  detected;	  and	   likewise	  when	  the	  
sure	  sum	  is	  greater	  than	  A7	  so	  that	  both	  of	  those	  probabilities	  are	  less	  than	  0.5.	  Even	  
if	   underlying	   preferences	   are	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3,	   the	   scope	   for	   demonstrating	  
violations	  of	  WST	  in	  the	  direction	  consistent	  with	  the	  classic	  PR	  pattern	  is	  limited.	  It	  
is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   even	   if	   all	   individuals	   have	   preferences	   with	   the	   potential	   to	  
violate	  WST,	  they	  may	  have	  different	  SIs	  such	  that	  any	  particular	  pre-­‐set	  value	  of	  A	  
will	  only	  fall	  into	  the	  critical	  range	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  them.	  	  	  
So	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  examination	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
probabilistic	  preferences	  respect	  WST	  for	  $	  and	  P	  bets,	  we	  need	  to	  elicit	  from	  each	  




amounts	   and	   see	   how	   the	   ordering	   of	   these	   SIs	   compares	   with	   the	  modal	   choice	  
between	  them.	  Denoting	  the	  SI	  for	  the	  S-­‐bet	  as	  SI($)	  and	  the	  SI	  for	  the	  P-­‐bet	  as	  SI(P),	  
the	  possibilities	  are	  as	  follows.	  If	  SI(P)	  ≥	  SI($)	  and	  Pr(P≻ $)	  ≥	  0.5,	  or	  if	  SI($)	  ≥	  SI(P)	  and	  
Pr($≻ P)	  ≥	  0.5,	  the	  individual	  conforms	  with	  WST.	  However,	  if	  SI($)	  >	  SI(P)	  but	  Pr(P≻
$)	  >	  0.5,	   the	   individual	   violates	  WST	   in	   the	  direction	   consistent	  with	   the	   classic	  PR	  
pattern,	   whereas	   if	   SI(P)	   >	   SI($)	   but	   Pr($≻ P)	   >	   0.5,	   the	   violation	   of	  WST	   is	   in	   the	  
opposite	  direction.	  The	  experimental	  design	  described	   in	  Section	  4	   seeks	   to	  obtain	  
the	  required	  estimates	  of	  SI($),	  SI(P)	  and	  Pr($≻ P).	  	  
	  
4.	  Experimental	  Design	  
4.1	  General	  Principles	  
In	  principle,	  we	  should	  like	  to	  take	  various	  $-­‐bets	  and	  P-­‐bets	  and,	  for	  each	  bet,	  
identify	   the	   range	   of	   sure	   sums	   that	   cover	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   highest	   sure	  
sum	  which	  is	  (almost)	  never	  preferred	  to	  the	  bet	  and	  the	  lowest	  sure	  sum	  which	  is	  
(almost)	   always	  preferred	   to	   the	  bet;	   and	  within	   that	   range,	   to	  have	  enough	  pairs	  
each	   repeated	   enough	   times	   (ideally,	   with	   each	   choice	   independent	   of	   all	   earlier	  
presentations	  of	  the	  same	  pair)	  to	  provide	  a	  good	  estimate	  of	  the	  curve	  in	  question	  
and	  a	  reasonably	  precise	  estimate	  of	  the	  SI	  point.	  
Bearing	   in	   mind	   that	   any	   sample	   is	   likely	   to	   involve	   some	   degree	   of	  
heterogeneity	  between	  individuals,	  in	  an	  ideal	  world	  one	  might	  like	  to	  have	  different	  
sure	   sums	   £0.50	   or	   £1	   apart	   covering	  most	   of	   the	   range	   between	   the	   upper	   and	  
lower	  P-­‐bet	  payoffs,	  with	  perhaps	  10	  repetitions	  of	  each	  {Aj,	  $}	  and	  {Aj,	  P}	  pair.	  One	  
might	  also	  like	  to	  have	  comparable	  numbers	  of	  repetitions	  between	  each	  {$,	  P}	  pair.	  
However,	  such	  a	  design	  could	  easily	  entail	   four	  or	  five	  hundred	  choices	  for	  a	  single	  
{$,	  P}	  pair,	  which,	  when	  interspersed	  among	  a	  similar	  number	  of	  ‘distractor’	  choices,	  
would	  be	  a	  daunting	  prospect	  for	  potential	  participants	  and	  might	  compromise	  the	  
quality	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
On	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   own	   and	   colleagues’	   experience	   and	   a	   pilot	   study,	   we	  
judged	   that	  we	   should	  produce	  a	  design	  using	  no	  more	   than	  200-­‐300	  questions	   in	  
total,	  with	  a	  number	  of	  these	  questions	  involving	  tasks	  other	  than	  binary	  choices	  in	  
order	   to	   try	   to	   provide	   some	   variety	   and	   extra	   interest	   for	   participants.7	   The	   net	  
                                                
7 When respondents are presented with a large number of tasks, there is necessarily a judgment to be 
made about the balance between task load and the quality of the data generated. However, it is not 
possible to conduct research into within-person variability without asking several series of questions 
each repeated at least several times. Inevitably this is liable to weaken the incentive per question. One 
of us – Loomes (2014) – has cast doubt upon the quality of the data in a study by Guo and Regenwetter 
(2014) which asked respondents to make 1,600 choices between pairs of lotteries in around 80 minutes. 
However, the doubts about those data are based upon an analysis of evidence of low sensitivity to 
parameter variations and abnormally high rates of violations of transparent dominance. Our task load 
was much lower than that in Guo and Regenwetter (2014) and, as we shall see, our data exhibited good 




result	  was	  a	  design	  that	  included	  up	  to	  36	  different	  pairs,	  with	  each	  pair	  presented	  as	  
binary	  choices	  (BCs)	  on	  four	  occasions	  during	  the	  experimental	  session	  and	  with	  each	  
of	  these	  presentations	  being	  separated	  from	  one	  another	  by	  a	  number	  of	  other	  pairs	  
also	  presented	  in	  random	  order.	  
We	  shall	  set	  out	  in	  subsequent	  subsections	  the	  particular	  parameters	  used	  and	  
we	   shall	   present	   evidence	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   data	   showed	   reasonable	  
sensitivity	  to	  variations	  in	  those	  parameters.	  But	  first	  we	  address	  a	  possible	  concern	  
about	   whether	   four	   repetitions	   are	   sufficient	   for	   our	   purposes.	   Certainly,	   if	   our	  
objective	   were	   to	   produce	   a	   reasonably	   tight-­‐fitting	   curve	   for	   each	   individual	   for	  
each	   lottery,	   four	   observations	   per	   pair	  would	   not	   be	   sufficient.	   However,	   for	   the	  
purpose	   of	   covering	   the	   range	   within	   which	   nearly	   everyone’s	   SI	   is	   located	   and	  
thereby	  getting	  an	  estimate	  of	  each	  SI,	  we	  believe	  that	  our	  design	  is	  adequate.	  	  
To	  explain	  how	  we	  analysed	  the	  data,	  consider	  Figure	  4,	  which	  shows	  on	  the	  
horizontal	   axis	   the	   different	   sure	   values	   that	   A	  might	   take,	   while	   the	   vertical	   axis	  
measures	   the	   numbers	   of	   times	   some	   bet	   is	   chosen	   in	   any	   four	   repeated	   pairings	  
with	  the	  same	  A.	  
The	   black	   dots	   represent	   the	   responses	   of	   an	   individual	   with	   probabilistic	  
preferences.	   When	   asked	   to	   choose	   between	   a	   $-­‐bet	   and	   nine	   sure	   sums,	   each	  
presented	   on	   four	   separated	   occasions,	   she	   always	   chooses	   the	   $-­‐bet	   when	   the	  
alternative	  is	  £4	  or	  £5	  and	  never	  chooses	  it	  when	  A	  offers	  £11	  or	  £12	  for	  sure.	  But	  for	  
sums	  from	  £6	  to	  £10,	  she	  chooses	  each	  alternative	  on	  at	  least	  one	  occasion	  –	  and	  is	  
even	  observed	  to	  choose	  the	  $-­‐bet	  more	  often	  (twice)	  when	  the	  sure	  amount	  is	  £8	  
than	  when	  the	  sure	  amount	  is	  £7.	  Of	  course,	  such	  seeming	  inconsistency	  is	  likely	  to	  
occur	  simply	  by	  chance	   if	   the	   individual	   is	  behaving	  as	   if	   sampling	   just	  a	   few	  times	  
from	  an	  underlying	  probability	  distribution	  of	  the	  kind	  described	  in	  Section	  3.	  





Her	  choices	  between	  a	  P-­‐bet	  and	  the	  same	  set	  of	  sure	  amounts	  are	  shown	  by	  
the	  grey	  diamonds.	  She	  always	  chooses	  the	  P-­‐bet	  when	  the	  sure	  alternative	  is	  £7	  or	  
less	  and	  she	  never	  chooses	  the	  bet	  when	  the	  sure	  sum	  is	  £8	  or	  more.	  Her	  behaviour	  
here	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  what	  we	  might	  expect	  of	  someone	  with	  deterministic	  
preferences	  whose	  CE	  lies	  between	  £7	  and	  £8	  and	  if	  we	  have	  to	  give	  a	  best	  estimate	  
of	  that	  CE,	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  do	  other	  than	  take	  the	  midpoint	  of	  £7.50.	  The	  same	  
applies	  to	  our	  best	  estimate	  for	  the	  SI	  of	  an	  individual	  with	  probabilistic	  preferences	  
who	  reports	  those	  choices.	  
Where	  does	  this	  individual’s	  sure-­‐sum	  SI	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  her	  SI	  
for	  the	  P-­‐bet?	  There	  is	  more	  variability	  in	  the	  $-­‐bet	  responses,	  but	  if	  we	  had	  to	  judge	  
which	  of	  the	  two	  bets	  had	  the	  greater	  SI	   in	  terms	  of	  sure	  sums,	  we	  should	  have	  to	  
conclude	  on	  this	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  them:	  for	  
£4,	  £5,	  £11	  and	  £12	  they	  make	  the	  same	  choices	  throughout;	  when	  the	  sure	  sum	  is	  
£6	  or	  £7,	   the	  P-­‐bet	   is	  chosen	  four	  more	  times;	  but	  when	  the	  sure	  sum	  is	  £8,	  £9	  or	  
£10,	  the	  P-­‐bet	  is	  chosen	  four	  fewer	  times.	  With	  the	  small	  number	  of	  discrete	  choice	  
observations	   involved,	   sophisticated	   econometric	   estimation	  may	   offer	   little	  more	  
than	  we	  can	  achieve	  by	  simply	  counting	  the	  number	  of	  times	  each	  bet	  is	  chosen	  out	  
of	   the	   total	   of	   36	   decisions.	   In	   the	   above	   example,	   each	   bet	   is	   chosen	   16	   times	  
against	  the	  same	  set	  of	  sure	  amounts,	  mapping	  to	  an	  SI	  value	  of	  £7.50.	  
Had	  the	  individual	  in	  the	  above	  example	  chosen	  (say)	  the	  P-­‐bet	  more	  often,	  it	  
would	  have	  suggested	  a	  higher	  SI	  value	  for	  that	  bet.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  the	  
she	  had	  made	  the	  same	  choices	  as	  above	  except	  that	  she	  had	  chosen	  the	  P-­‐bet	  twice	  
in	  the	  {£8,	  P}	  pair.	  On	  that	  basis,	  an	  SI	  of	  £8	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  best	  estimate.	  In	  
other	   words,	   choosing	   the	   bet	   18	   times	   in	   total	  maps	   to	   an	   SI	   value	   of	   £8.	  More	  
generally,	  when	  the	  range	  of	  A	  options	   is	  as	  shown	   in	  Figure	  4	  and	  when	  each	   {Aj,	  
bet}	   pair	   is	   presented	   on	   four	   separated	   occasions,	   we	   estimate	   SI(bet)	   =	   £3.5	   +	  
0.25B,	  where	  0	  <	  B	  <	  36	  is	  the	  total	  number	  of	  times	  a	  particular	  bet	  is	  chosen.8	  
We	  shall	  therefore	  conduct	  our	  analysis	  of	  SI	  points	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  numbers	  of	  
times	  the	  bet	  in	  question	  is	  chosen	  from	  any	  given	  range	  of	  alternatives.	  There	  will	  of	  
course	   be	   some	   sampling	   error	   for	   such	   a	   measure,	   but	   our	   sample	   sizes	   in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  within-­‐subject	  nature	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  still	  allow	  us	  to	  draw	  a	  
number	  of	  conclusions.	  
	  
4.2	  Experiment	  1	  
Experiment	  1	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  direct	  choice	  between	  $	  and	  
P	   and	   the	   ordering	   of	   the	   SI	   values	   inferred	   from	   repeated	   choices	   involving	   the	  
                                                
8 The SI value is not well-defined if B = 0 or if B = 36: in the former case, we can only conclude that X 
≤ £3.50 and in the latter case that X ≥ 12.50; but for all other cases, each extra observation of the bet 




same	   set	   of	   sure	   amounts.	   In	   short,	   it	   was	   designed	   to	   look	   for	   evidence	   about	  
conformity	   with	   –	   or	   else	   systematic	   departure	   from	   –	   WST	   when	   such	   bets	   are	  
involved.	  The	  conventional	  wisdom,	  as	  expressed	  in	  Rieskamp	  et	  al.	  (2006,	  p.	  648)	  is	  
that	   violations	   of	   WST	   are	   quite	   rare	   and	   tend	   to	   occur	   only	   in	   “fairly	   unusual”	  
circumstances,	  so	  that	  “the	  principle	  of	  weak	  stochastic	  transitivity	  should	  generally	  
be	  retained	  as	  a	  bound	  of	  rationality”.	  Unfortunately,	  a	  number	  of	  the	  experiments	  
they	   cite	   could	   be	   argued	   to	   have	   involved	   too	   few	   repetitions	   over	   too	  narrow	  a	  
range	  to	  provide	  a	  really	  strong	  foundation	  for	  this	  conclusion.	  Our	  experiment	  had	  
the	  drawback	  that	  it	  was	  constructed	  around	  just	  one	  {$,	  P}	  pair,	  but	  its	  strength	  was	  
that	   it	   involved	   multiple	   repetitions	   and	   therefore	   gave	   a	   reasonable	   chance	   of	  
detecting	  violations	  of	  WST,	  if	  there	  were	  any	  to	  be	  detected.	  	  
In	   our	   pair,	   what	   we	   shall	   call	   the	   focal	   $-­‐bet	   offered	   a	   0.3	   chance	   of	   £40	  
(otherwise	  0)	  and	  our	  focal	  P-­‐bet	  offered	  a	  0.7	  chance	  of	  £15	  (otherwise	  0).	  Each	  bet	  
was	  displayed	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  upper	  panel	  of	  Figure	  5	  when	  participants	  were	  being	  
asked	  to	  make	  a	  straight	  choice	  between	  the	  two	  bets	  and	  as	  in	  the	  lower	  panel	  of	  
Figure	  5	  when	  the	  alternative	  was	  a	  sure	  sum	  of	  money	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  choice	  is	  
between	  our	  focal	  $-­‐bet	  and	  £11	  for	  sure.	  The	  text	  accompanying	  each	  kind	  of	  choice	  
is	  also	  reproduced.	  
We	   opted	   for	   this	   way	   of	   displaying	   alternatives	   in	   order	   to	   try	   to	   strike	   a	  
compromise	   between	   the	   ‘decision	   by	   description’	   and	   ‘decision	   by	   experience’	  
approaches.	   A	   growing	   literature9	   suggests	   that	  when	   people	   form	   an	   estimate	   of	  
probabilities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  sampling	  experience,	  they	  may	  behave	  differently	  
from	   when	   the	   probabilities	   are	   merely	   stated	   in	   decimal	   or	   percentage	   form	  
without	   the	   opportunity	   for	   participants	   to	   get	   some	   ‘feel’	   for	   them.	   The	   large	  
number	   of	   decisions	   in	   our	   design	  made	   it	   impossible	   to	   ask	   people	   to	   learn	   the	  
probabilities	   for	  each	  choice	  by	   sampling,	  but	  by	   showing	   the	  distributions	  of	  balls	  
that	  give	  positive	  or	  zero	  payoffs	   in	  a	  format	  that	  allowed	  probabilities	  to	  be	  easily	  
seen	  and	  compared,	  we	  hoped	  to	  provide	  a	  visual	  proxy	  for	  experience	  by	  showing	  
exactly	  what	  each	  option	  would	   involve	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  20	  balls	   that	  would	  be	  put	  
into	  a	  bag	  when	  one	  of	  the	  choices	  came	  to	  be	  played	  out	  for	  real.	  
The	  focal	  $-­‐bet	  was	  presented	  on	  four	  separated	  occasions	  in	  choices	  with	  nine	  
different	  sure	  integer	  amounts	  from	  £4	  to	  £12,	  providing	  a	  total	  of	  36	  BCs.	  The	  focal	  
P-­‐bet	  was	  offered	  against	   the	  same	  nine	  sure	  sums,	  giving	  another	  36	  choices.	  We	  
also	   had	   nine	   pairs	   where	   the	   focal	   $-­‐bet	   was	   fixed	   while	   the	   alternative	   bet’s	  
probability	  of	  £15	  varied	  from	  0.5	  to	  0.9	  with	  increments	  of	  0.05,	  each	  presented	  on	  
four	   separated	   occasions;	   and	   another	   nine	   pairs	   where	   the	   focal	   P-­‐bet	   was	   held	  
constant	  while	  the	  alternative	  bet’s	  probability	  of	  £40	  varied	  from	  0.15	  to	  0.55	  with	  
increments	  of	  0.05.	  Thus	  we	  have	  a	  total	  of	  4	  x	  9	  x	  4	  =	  144	  BCs.	  For	  each	  individual,	  
                                                




then,	  we	   can	  estimate	  a	   certainty	  equivalent	   SI	   for	   the	   focal	   $-­‐bet	   and	  a	   certainty	  
equivalent	  SI	  for	  the	  focal	  P-­‐bet,	  and	  we	  can	  compare	  the	  ordering	  of	  these	  SIs	  with	  
the	  frequency	  of	  choice	  from	  a	  total	  of	  eight	  separated	  presentations	  of	  the	  focal	  {$,	  
P}	  pair.	  
This	   experiment	   involved	   101	   participants	   through	   the	   online	   recruitment	  
system	   of	   the	   Decision	   Research	   at	   Warwick	   (DR@W)	   Group	   in	   the	   University	   of	  
Warwick.	  Each	  participant	  received	  an	  invitation	  with	  detailed	  instructions	  together	  
with	   a	   link	   to	   the	   online	   experiment.	   	   Participants	   were	   invited	   to	   complete	   the	  
online	  experiment	  in	  their	  own	  time	  by	  a	  specified	  deadline.	  Each	  invited	  participant	  
was	  assigned	  a	  unique	  ID	  number	  which	  was	  automatically	  copied	  as	  a	  password	  to	  
the	  experimental	  interface.	  This	  insured	  that	  (a)	  only	  invited	  participants	  could	  take	  
part	  in	  the	  experiment	  and	  (b)	  none	  of	  participants	  could	  take	  part	  more	  than	  once.	  	  
The	  experiment	  was	  computerised	  using	  the	  Experimental	  Toolbox	  (EXPERT)	  online	  
platform.10	  
Besides	   the	   144	   BC	   questions	   described	   above,	   there	   were	   a	   further	   36	  
questions	  presented	   in	   the	   form	  of	   four	  9-­‐row	  choice	   lists:	   these	   took	   the	   total	  of	  
incentivised	  lottery-­‐based	  tasks	  to	  180,	  with	  these	  being	  mixed	  up	  and	  spread	  over	  
sections	  1,	  3	  and	  5	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Sections	  2	  and	  4	  consisted	  of	  quite	  different	  
tasks	  involving	  2	  x	  6	  hypothetical	  questions	  of	  the	  type	  used	  in	  the	  Domain	  Specific	  
Risk	  Attitude	  (DoSpeRT)	  procedure	  (Blais	  and	  Weber,	  2006).	  These	  two	  sections	  were	  
included	   as	   ‘distractor’	   tasks	   for	   our	   participants,	   providing	   greater	   separation	  
between	  repetitions	  of	  the	  incentivised	  questions.	  They	  play	  no	  part	  in	  our	  analysis.	  
 
 
Figure	  5:	  Examples	  of	  Displays	  Used	  in	  Binary	  Choices	  
	  
(a) Binary	  choice	  between	  the	  focal	  $-­‐bet	  and	  the	  focal	  P-­‐bet	  
 
 
                                                




(b) Binary	  choice	  between	  the	  focal	  $-­‐bet	  and	  an	  amount	  of	  money	  for	  certain	  
 
 
The	  incentive	  mechanism	  was	  as	  follows.	  On	  the	  date	  of	  the	  specified	  deadline,	  
100	  participants	  were	  selected	  at	   random	  from	  all	  participants	  who	  completed	  the	  
experiment	  on	   time.11	   These	  participants	  were	   invited	   to	   the	  DR@W	  experimental	  
laboratory	   for	   individual	   scheduled	   appointments.	  One	   of	   the	   180	   incentive-­‐linked	  
questions	   was	   picked	   at	   random	   and	   independently	   for	   each	   participant	   and	   was	  
played	  out	  for	  real	  money.	  There	  was	  no	  show-­‐up	  fee	  and	  the	   instructions	  made	  it	  
clear	  that	  the	  participant’s	  entire	  payment	  depended	  on	  how	  her	  decision	  played	  out	  
in	  the	  one	  randomly-­‐selected	  question.	  	  
If	   the	  participant	  had	  chosen	  some	  sure	  amount	  of	  money,	  she	  would	  simply	  
receive	   that	   sum.	   If	   she	  had	  chosen	  a	   lottery,	   she	  would	   see	  an	  opaque	  bag	  being	  
filled	  with	  the	  numbers	  of	  red	  and	  black	  balls	  (actually,	  coloured	  marbles)	  specified	  
in	   the	   question.	   She	   then	   picked	   a	   marble	   at	   random	   and	   was	   paid	   (or	   not)	  
accordingly.	  	  
This	  incentive	  mechanism	  was	  described	  to	  all	  participants	  in	  the	  instructions.	  
Participants	  also	  received	  a	  practice	  question	  and	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  e-­‐mail	  the	  
experimental	  team	  in	  case	  they	  were	  not	  clear	  about	  the	  instructions.	  On	  average,	  it	  
took	   each	   participant	   30-­‐40	   minutes	   to	   complete	   the	   online	   experiment.	   Each	  
individual	   appointment	   in	   the	  DR@W	   laboratory	   lasted	  between	  3	   and	   5	  minutes.	  
The	  average	  payoff	  in	  the	  experiment	  was	  approximately	  £12.	  
We	   begin	   by	   presenting	   various	   aggregate	   patterns	   of	   response,	   so	   that	  
readers	   can	   form	   some	   view	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   data	   showed	   broad	  
regularities	  of	  the	  kind	  most	  models	  might	  entail.	  Table	  1	  shows	  how	  the	  likelihoods	  
                                                
11 This experiment was in fact one of two being conducted in parallel using the same general format of 
displays but with quite different questions. 101 saw the questions relating to preference reversal as 
reported in this paper. Another 148 were presented with questions that were investigating the 
Independence axiom – the results of which are reported in Loomes and Pogrebna (2014a). So in total, 
249 individuals participated in one or other of the experiments, and the 100 who played a decision for 
real were drawn at random from the 249. At the time when individuals were deciding to take part, 
neither they nor we knew what the total number of participants would be, but the promise to pay 100 




of	   choosing	   the	   fixed	   lotteries	   changed	   as	   the	   alternatives	   became	   progressively	  
better.	   In	   all	   cases,	   the	   proportions	   were	   sensitive	   in	   the	   expected	   directions	   to	  
variations	  in	  parameters.	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Aggregate	  Binary	  Choice	  Proportions	  in	  Experiment	  1	  
	  
 Sure Amounts  
 £4 £5 £6 £7 £8 £9 £10 £11 £12 
$-bet* chosen 
% 
78.7 65.4 60.2 50.0 41.6 35.9 15.8 15.6 8.7 
P-bet* chosen 
% 
92.1 87.4 81.2 75.2 64.9 53.2 28.0 18.8 12.9 
 Chances of £15 offered by variants of the P-bet	  
 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
$-bet* chosen 
% 
59.9 34.9 29.5 18.3 17.6 12.6 7.2 6.4 4.2 
 Chances of £40 offered by variants of the $-bet 
 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 
P-bet* chosen 
% 
98.5 97.0 94.3 84.4 74.8 58.2 43.3 26.0 17.8 
*Note: Focal $-bet = (£40, 0.3; 0, 0.7); focal P-bet = (£15, 0.7; 0, 0.3) 
 
At	   this	   aggregate	   level,	   the	   central	   tendencies	   look	   broadly	   consistent	   with	  
transitivity.	   Overall,	   the	   P-­‐bet	   was	   chosen	   in	   just	   over	   83%	   of	   the	   direct	   choices	  
between	  the	  focal	  $-­‐bet	  and	  the	  focal	  P-­‐bet.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
choices	   between	   each	   bet	   and	   the	   different	   sure	   amounts,	   the	   sample	   median	  
valuation	  of	  P	  was	  a	  little	  over	  £9	  while	  the	  sample	  median	  valuation	  of	  $	  was	  £7.	  At	  
this	   level	   of	   analysis,	   the	   majority	   choice	   was	   compatible	   with	   the	   ordering	   of	  
median	  values.	  
However,	  the	  usual	  PR	  asymmetry	  is	  an	  individual-­‐level	  phenomenon.	  So	  Table	  
2	   assigns	   individuals	   to	   cells	   according	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   frequency	  
with	  which	  they	  chose	  $	  or	  P	  in	  the	  direct	  choice	  between	  them	  (shown	  in	  the	  rows)	  
and	   the	   ordering	   over	   the	   two	   bets	   inferred	   from	   the	   difference	   between	   their	   SI	  











Table	  2:	  Choice	  and	  SI	  Valuation	  Differences	  Inferred	  from	  BCs	  in	  Experiment	  1 
 
 SI(P)–SI($)  


















        
8 P ; 0 $ 33 15 13 4 2 3 - 70 
         
7 P ; 1 $ 2 1 2 - 2 1 - 8 
         
6 P ; 2 $ - 2 1 - - - - 3 
         
5 P ; 3 $ 1 2 - - - 1 - 4 
         
4 P ; 4 $ 1 - - 1 - - - 2 
         
3 P ; 5 $ - - - 1 - - 1 2 
         
2 P ; 6 $ - - - - - 2 - 2 
         
1 P ; 7 $ - - 1 1 - - - 2 
         
0 P ; 8 $ - - - 2 - 5 1 8 
         
Total 37 20 17 9 4 12 2 101 
 
The	  two	  sets	  of	  cells	  which	  represent	  a	  strict	  reversal	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  the	  other	  
are	  enclosed	  in	  heavier	  border	  lines.	  In	  total,	  10	  of	  the	  101	  individuals	  fell	  into	  these	  
cells,	  with	  another	  10	  either	  choosing	  each	  bet	  equally	  frequently	  or	  having	  the	  same	  
SI	   certainty	  equivalents	   (or	  both,	   in	  one	  case).	  The	  10	  strict	   reversals	  were	  divided	  
9:1	   in	   the	   ‘usual’	   direction	   –	   an	   asymmetry	   that	   is	   unlikely	   to	   have	   occurred	   by	  
chance	  –	  but	  by	  comparison	  with	  most	  PR	  experiments	  involving	  direct	  elicitation	  of	  
selling/buying	   prices,	   the	   overall	   proportion	   of	   reversals	   was	   low.	   	  Moreover,	   the	  
magnitudes	  of	   the	  differences	  were	   small	  by	   comparison	  with	  many	   selling/buying	  
price	   experiments	   –	   in	   the	   present	   experiment,	   the	   greatest	   SI	   difference	   in	   the	  
‘wrong’	   direction	   was	   just	   £1.50.	   So	   it	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   there	   was	   some	  
tendency	   towards	   intransitivity	   in	   the	   classic	   direction	   which	   cannot	   be	   explained	  
simply	  in	  terms	  of	  noise/error;	  but	  the	  effects	  were	  modest	  and	  the	  overall	  picture	  is	  





However,	  Experiment	  1	  was	  built	  around	   just	  one	  particular	   {$,	  P}	  pair	  and	   it	  
could	   be	   objected	   that	   the	   results	  might	   not	   generalise	   to	   other	   pairs.	  Moreover,	  
Experiment	  1	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  choice-­‐based	  tasks	  and	  did	  not	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
elicit	  valuations	   in	  a	  more	  direct	  way,	  using	  the	  kind	  of	   incentive	  mechanism	  more	  
commonly	   used	   in	   conjunction	   with	   selling/buying	   prices	   in	   traditional	   preference	  
reversal	  experiments.	   So	   in	  Experiment	  2	  we	  used	   slightly	  more	  extreme	  bets	   that	  
might	  be	  regarded	  as	  (even)	  more	  typical	  of	  many	  PR	  experiments	  and	  we	  added	  a	  
conventional	   valuation	   task	   to	   the	  other	   formats	   used	   in	   Experiment	   1	   so	   that	  we	  
could	  make	  direct	  within-­‐person	  comparisons.	  
4.3	  Experiment	  2	  
Many	  features	  of	  this	  experiment	  were	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  numbers	  of	  binary	  choices	  and	  the	  incentive	  system	  for	  those	  choices.	  The	  two	  
key	  differences	  between	  this	  experiment	  and	  the	  previous	  one	  were	  as	  follows.	  First,	  
the	  new	  focal	  $-­‐bet	  offered	  a	  0.25	  chance	  of	  £50	  (otherwise	  0)	  and	  the	  new	  focal	  P-­‐
bet	  offered	  a	  0.8	  chance	  of	  £12	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  two	  bets	  were	  a	  little	  further	  apart	  in	  
terms	   of	   probabilities	   and	   payoffs	   and	   expected	   values	   than	   the	   pair	   in	   the	   first	  
experiment.	   Second,	   we	   dropped	   the	   DoSpeRT	   questions	   and	   replaced	   them	   in	  
Sections	  2	  and	  4	  with	  20	  direct	  valuation	   (DV)	   tasks	   linked	  to	   the	  kind	  of	   incentive	  
mechanism	  often	  used,	  due	  to	  Becker,	  DeGroot	  and	  Marschak	  (1964).	  Those	  20	  DV	  
tasks	   involved	   five	   different	   lotteries,	   each	   valued	   on	   two	   separated	   occasions	   in	  
Section	  2,	  and	  again	  twice	  each	  in	  Section	  4,	  thus	  giving	  four	  separated	  valuations	  for	  
each	   lottery.	  Figure	  6	  shows	  an	  example	  of	  a	   typical	  DV	  task	  –	   in	   this	  case,	   for	   the	  
focal	  P-­‐bet	  in	  the	  current	  experiment.	  
Two	   of	   those	   five	   lotteries	  were	   the	   $-­‐bet	   and	   P-­‐bet	  which	   are	   focal	   to	   this	  
experiment.	   Two	  others	  were	   the	   $-­‐bet	   and	   P-­‐bet	   used	   in	   Experiment	   1.	   The	   fifth	  
lottery	   was	   one	   used	   in	   the	   ‘independence’	   experiment	   run	   in	   parallel	   with	  
Experiment	  1,	  as	  referred	  to	  in	  footnote	  11	  above.	  
By	  embedding	  the	  DV	  tasks	   in	  among	  many	  BCs	   involving	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  
bets	  and	  sure	  amounts,	  our	   intention	  was	  to	  give	  participants	  every	  opportunity	  to	  
be	  consistent	  across	  the	  two	  types	  of	  task.	  We	  also	  tried	  to	  formulate	  the	  valuation	  
task	  to	  be	  as	  much	  like	  a	  choice	  task	  as	  we	  could,	  avoiding	  any	  reference	  to	  ‘price’	  or	  
to	  selling	  or	  buying.	  That	  is,	  we	  were	  consciously	  attempting	  to	  reduce	  any	  framing	  
effects	  so	  as	  to	  examine	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  valuation	  task	  per	  se	  was	  treated	  
differently	  than	  a	  series	  of	  binary	  choices.	  
To	   respond,	   participants	   used	   a	   mouse	   to	   click	   on	   the	   button	   –	   which	   was	  
always	   initially	   located	   at	   zero	   to	   avoid	   any	   differential	   ‘starting	   point’	   effects	  
between	   the	   different	   lotteries	   –	   and	   to	   move	   it	   along	   the	   slider.	   As	   the	   button	  
moved,	   two	   values	   that	   were	   multiples	   of	   £0.10	   and	   were	   always	   £0.10	   apart	  
appeared	   in	   the	   boxes	   just	   above	   the	   slider,	   rising	   or	   falling	   as	   the	   button	   was	  




Confirm	   and	   Proceed	   and	   then	   either	   valued	   a	   fresh	   lottery	   or	   else,	   at	   the	   end	  of	  
each	  series	  of	  ten	  valuations,	  moved	  on	  to	  another	  series	  of	  BCs.	  	  
So,	   for	   example,	   an	   individual	  might	  move	   the	   slider,	   steadily	   increasing	   the	  
amounts	   shown	   in	   the	  boxes	  until	   (say)	   the	   left-­‐hand	  box	  displayed	  £7.50	  and	   the	  
right-­‐hand	   box	   displayed	   £7.60.	   The	   respondent	  would	   thereby	   be	   stating	   that	   he	  
would	   rather	  play	   the	   lottery	   than	  get	  £7.50	  and	  would	   rather	  get	  £7.60	   than	  play	  
the	  lottery.	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Example	  of	  Display	  Used	  in	  Experiment	  2	  Direct	  Valuation	  
 
 
A	  total	  of	  184	  participants	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Warwick	  completed	  all	  of	  the	  
BC	  and	  DV	  questions.	  On	  this	  basis,	  for	  each	  participant	  we	  could	  identify	  from	  the	  
BC	  responses:	  
• The	  individual’s	  SI	  certainty	  equivalent	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet;12	  
• The	  individual’s	  SI	  certainty	  equivalent	  for	  the	  P-­‐bet;	  
• The	  distribution	  of	  8	  straight	  choices	  between	  $	  and	  P.	  
                                                




And	  from	  the	  20	  DV	  questions,	  we	  had:13	  
• 4	  estimates	  of	  the	  certainty	  equivalent	  of	  the	  $-­‐bet	  in	  this	  experiment;	  
• 4	  estimates	  of	  the	  certainty	  equivalent	  of	  the	  P-­‐bet	  in	  this	  experiment;	  
• 4	  estimates	  of	  the	  certainty	  equivalent	  of	  the	  $-­‐bet	  used	  in	  
Experiment	  1;	  
• 4	  estimates	  of	  the	  certainty	  equivalent	  of	  the	  P-­‐bet	  used	  in	  
Experiment	  1;	  
• 4	  estimates	  of	  the	  certainty	  equivalent	  of	  a	  lottery	  offering	  (£40,	  0.8;	  
0,	  0.2)	  used	  in	  the	  ‘independence’	  experiment	  for	  which	  we	  have	  BC-­‐
based	  SIs.	  
Although	  the	  last	  three	  sets	  of	  certainty	  equivalents	  do	  not	  give	  us	  the	  within-­‐
person	   information	   that	   we	   can	   get	   from	   the	   first	   two,	   the	   participants	   in	   all	  
experiments	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  same	  sampling	  frame	  –	  the	  DR@W	  list	  mentioned	  
earlier	  –	  and	  we	  hoped	  that	  the	  additional	  between-­‐sample	  information	  might	  prove	  
useful.	  
Table	   3	   below	   presents	   some	   aggregate	   results	   for	   the	   BC	   responses	   in	   the	  
current	  experiment,	  comparable	  with	  the	  data	  presented	  in	  Table	  1	  for	  Experiment	  
1.	  
Table	  3:	  Aggregate	  Binary	  Choice	  Proportions	  in	  Experiment	  2 
 Sure Amounts 
 £4 £5 £6 £7 £8 £9 £10 £11 
$-bet* chosen 
% 
70.7 58.0 47.6 38.7 32.7 26.9 15.5 14.8 
P-bet* chosen 
% 
92.3 88.5 84.4 69.4 53.8 45.4 20.9 13.9 
 Chances of £12 offered by variants of the P-bet 
 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95  
$-bet* chosen 
% 
39.5 31.0 25.3 20.1 17.5 14.0 12.2  
 Chances of £50 offered by variants of the $-bet 
 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4  
P-bet* chosen 
% 
97.4 97.0 89.4 80.0 70.2 58.3 43.3  
*Note: Focal $-bet = (£50, 0.25; 0, 0.75); focal P-bet = (£12, 0.8; 0, 0.2) 
 
As	  before,	  the	  aggregate	  data	  look	  responsive	  in	  the	  expected	  direction	  across	  
the	   different	   parameter	   variations.	   	   The	   sample	   median	   value	   for	   the	   P-­‐bet	   was	  
somewhere	   between	   £8	   and	   £9	   and	   the	   sample	   median	   value	   for	   the	   $-­‐bet	   was	  
below	   £6.	   In	   direct	   choices	   between	   the	   focal	   $-­‐bet	   and	   the	   focal	   P-­‐bet,	   P	   was	  
chosen	  80%	  of	   the	   time.	  So,	  as	  before,	   the	  aggregate	  data	   look	  broadly	   consistent	  
with	  transitivity.	  
                                                
13 Throughout, we took the lower of the two numbers in the boxes to avoid any possibility that any 




However,	  as	  before,	  the	  data	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  for	  our	  purposes	  are	  the	  
individual-­‐level	  comparisons.	  Table	  4	  displays	  the	  BC-­‐based	  results	  for	  Experiment	  2	  
in	  similar	  format	  to	  that	  used	  in	  Table	  2	  for	  the	  previous	  experiment.	  
Again,	   heavier	   border	   lines	   enclose	   the	   two	   sets	   of	   cells	   where	   there	   were	  
strict	   reversals	   between	   the	   ordering	   inferred	   from	   the	   SIs	   and	   the	   majority	   of	  
choices	  in	  the	  {$,	  P}	  pairs.	  This	  time	  there	  were	  13	  individuals	  –	  just	  over	  7%	  of	  the	  
sample	  –	  exhibiting	  such	  reversals,	  dividing	  12:1	  in	  the	  direction	  consistent	  with	  the	  
usual	  PR	  asymmetry.	  So	  although	  this	  asymmetry	  was	  unlikely	  to	  have	  occurred	  by	  
chance,	  the	  overall	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect	  was	  again	  rather	  modest,	  and	  far	  short	  of	  
the	   scale	   necessary	   to	   underpin	   the	   rates	   of	   preference	   reversal	   reported	   in	  most	  
studies.	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  4:	  Choice	  and	  SI	  Valuation	  Differences	  Inferred	  from	  BCs	  in	  Experiment	  2	  

















         
8 P ; 0 
$ 
68 20 19 11 7 2 - 127 
         
7 P ; 1 
$ 
6 - - - 3 - - 9 
         
6 P ; 2 
$ 
1 - 4 - - - - 5 
         
5 P ; 3 
$ 
- 1 2 - - - - 3 
         
4 P ; 4 
$ 
- - 1 2 2 - - 5 
         
3 P ; 5 
$ 
- - - - 2 3 - 5 
         
2 P ; 6 
$ 
- - - - 3 2 - 5 
         
1 P ; 7 
$ 
- - 1 - 1 2 4 8 
         
0 P ; 8 
$ 
- - - 2 4 9 2 17 
Total 75 21 27 15 22 18 6 184 
We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  DV	  responses	  generated	  by	  the	  same	  184	  individuals.	  Most	  




the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  each	  individual’s	  four	  DVs	  for	  each	  bet,	  there	  were	  just	  16	  
(8.7%)	   who	   had	   zero	   standard	   deviations	   for	   both	   bets.14	   	   The	   sample	   average	  
(median)	   of	   individual	   standard	   deviations	   was	   0.88	   (0.58)	   for	   the	   P-­‐bet	   and	   4.32	  
(2.89)	   for	   the	   $-­‐bet.	   Since	   the	  medians	   show	   less	   vulnerability	   to	   outliers	   and	   are	  
comparable	  with	   SIs,	   Table	   5	   replaces	   the	   SI	   differences	   in	   Table	   4	   by	   differences	  
between	  the	  median	  values	  derived	   from	  the	  DV	  tasks.	  However,	  since	   individuals’	  
DV	  differences	  covered	  a	  much	  wider	  range,	  the	  column	  specifications	  are	  adjusted	  
accordingly.	  	  
Table	  5:	  Choice	  and	  Differences	  Between	  Median	  Direct	  Values	  in	  Experiment	  2	  





























          
8 P ; 0 
$ 
12 9 1 3 6 13 45 38 127 
          
7 P ; 1 
$ 
- 1 - - - - 4 4 9 
          
6 P ; 2 
$ 
- - 1 - - 1 3 - 5 
          
5 P ; 3 
$ 
- - - - - - 2 1 3 
          
4 P ; 4 
$ 
- - - - - 1 3 1 5 
          
3 P ; 5 
$ 
- - - - - - 3 2 5 
          
2 P ; 6 
$ 
1 - - - - - 2 2 5 
          
1 P ; 7 
$ 
- - - - - - 6 2 8 
          
0 P ; 8 
$ 
- - - - - 2 10 5 17 
Total 13 10 2 3 6 17 78 55 184 
                                                
14 Of these, 7 always stated the expected values of the bets; 1 always gave a value of £10; and 8 always 
gave extreme values – 7 stating the maximum payoff for each bet, 1 stating the maximum payoff for 




Clearly,	  the	  DV	  tasks	  elicited	  responses	  which	  were	  substantially	  different	  from	  
the	  patterns	  of	  values	  inferred	  from	  BCs.	  Table	  4	  shows	  that	  46	  individuals	  (25%	  of	  
the	  sample)	  had	  SI($)	  >	  SI(P),	  whereas	  Table	  5	  shows	  that	  for	  156	  (84.8%)	  individuals,	  
median	   DV($)	   was	   higher	   than	  median	   DV(P).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   there	   were	   117	  
classic	   preference	   reversals	   as	   compared	   with	   just	   1	   individual	   reversing	   in	   the	  
opposite	  direction.	  
Going	   from	   a	   ratio	   of	   13:1	   BC-­‐based	   reversals	   to	   a	   ratio	   of	   117:1	   CV-­‐based	  
reversals	  is	  a	  remarkable	  disparity.	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  102	  (87.2%)	  of	  those	  117	  chose	  P	  
on	   all	   eight	   occasions	  when	   asked	   to	  make	   a	   direct	   {$,	   P}	   choice.	   It	   is	   even	  more	  
striking	   that	   no	   fewer	   than	   85	   of	   these	   –	   nearly	   half	   of	   the	   sample	   –	   exhibited	  
‘strong’	   reversals	   of	   the	   kind	   referred	   to	   in	   footnote	   5:	   that	   is,	   even	   though	   their	  
median	  value	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet	  was	  strictly	  higher	  than	  the	  £12	  payoff	  offered	  by	  the	  P-­‐
bet,	  they	  chose	  the	  P-­‐bet	  over	  the	  $-­‐bet	  on	  every	  one	  of	  the	  eight	  occasions	  when	  
they	  were	  asked	  to	  make	  a	  straight	  choice.	  Although	  Blavatskyy’s	  (2009)	  model	  can	  
in	  principle	  accommodate	  some	  strong	  reversals,	  the	  parameters	  we	  used	  lie	  outside	  
the	   set	   to	   which	   that	   possibility	   applies	   under	   the	   conditions	   he	   assumed	   –	   see	  
Figure	  2	   in	  Blavatskyy	   (2009,	  p.	  246).	  Such	  a	   large	  and	  pervasive	  disparity	  between	  
BC	  and	  DV	  invites	  further	  analysis	  and	  discussion.	  	  	  
	  
	  
5.	  Competing	  Explanations:	  Further	  Exploration	  of	  the	  Data	  
	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  data,	  we	  can	  confidently	  reject	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  classic	  PR	  
phenomenon	  results	  primarily	   from	  intransitive	  choices.	  Rather,	  our	  data	  appear	  to	  
be	   more	   in	   line	   with	   Tversky	   et	   al.’s	   (1990)	   suggestion	   that	   the	   phenomenon	   is	  
mainly	  due	  to	  a	  mixture	  of	  overvaluing	  the	  $-­‐bet	  and/or	  undervaluing	  the	  P-­‐bet.	  
However,	  as	  noted	  in	  Section	  2,	  Tversky	  et	  al.	  (1990)	  only	  asked	  a	  limited	  range	  
of	  one-­‐off	  choice	  questions	  and	  they	  elicited	  valuations	  via	  an	  ordinal	  scheme	  that	  
could	   not	   be	   guaranteed	   to	   incentivise	   participants	   to	   give	   their	   best	   estimates	   of	  
magnitudes	  of	  values.	  By	  contrast,	  we	  used	  a	  spectrum	  of	  repeated	  binary	  choices;	  
and	   in	  our	  DV	  elicitation,	  we	  used	  an	   incentive	  mechanism	  of	   the	  more	   traditional	  
type	  intended	  to	  encourage	  accurate	  revelation	  of	  actual	  values.	  Our	  data	  therefore	  
offer	   opportunities	   to	   look	   more	   closely	   at	   the	   generality	   of	   Tversky	   et	   al.’s	  
conclusions.	  
Before	  doing	  so,	  we	  make	  a	   remark	  about	   the	   framing	  of	   the	  Tversky	  et	  al.’s	  
conclusions.	  To	  say	  that	  a	  bet	  is	  ‘overvalued’	  or	  ‘undervalued’	  might	  be	  interpreted	  
as	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  a	  ‘gold	  standard’	  against	  which	  such	  values	  can	  be	  judged,	  
with	   the	   gold	   standard	   in	   this	   case	   presumably	   being	   the	   preferences	   revealed	   by	  
binary	   choice.	   However,	   once	   we	   begin	   to	   think	   in	   terms	   of	   responses	   as	   being	  
probabilistic	  rather	  than	  deterministic,	   it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  argue	  that	  one	  type	  of	  




expressions	  of	  preference	  must	  be	  to	  some	  extent	  biased.	  So	  we	  are	  agnostic	  on	  the	  
question	   of	   what	   constitutes	   ‘true’	   preference.	   However,	   and	   subject	   to	   that	  
reservation,	  since	  most	  formal	  decision	  theories	  tend	  to	  be	  built	  on	  binary	  relations,	  
we	  will	  take	  the	  BC	  responses	  as	  our	  reference	  point	  and	  use	  the	  terms	  ‘overvalued’	  
and	  ‘undervalued’	  as	  shorthand	  ways	  of	  describing	  DVs	  relative	  to	  the	  BC	  baseline.	  
We	  begin	  by	  considering	  the	  data	  from	  Experiment	  2	  which	  allowed	  us	  to	  make	  
184	  comparisons	  between	  each	  individual’s	  median	  DV	  and	  his/her	  SI	  point	  for	  each	  
bet.	  Starting	  with	  the	  $-­‐bet,	  there	  were	  just	  10	  participants	  for	  whom	  DV($)	  <	  SI($)	  
and	  one	  for	  whom	  the	  two	  were	  equal.	  Thus	  94%	  of	  our	  sample	  gave	  a	  median	  DV($)	  
strictly	  higher	  than	  the	  SI($)	   inferred	  from	  their	  repeated	  BCs.	  The	  sample	  mean	  of	  
DV($)	  based	  on	  individual	  medians	  was	  £18.32,	  compared	  with	  a	  sample	  mean	  SI($)	  
of	  £6.55,	   giving	  an	  average	  within-­‐person	  difference	  of	  £11.77	  between	  DV($)	   and	  
SI($).	  The	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  is	  very	  definitely	  rejected	  (p	  <	  
0.001).	   In	   this	   respect,	  our	  data	   reinforce	  Tversky	  et	  al.’s	   findings	   that	   the	  DV	   task	  
overvalues	  the	  $-­‐bet.	  
However,	  we	  do	  not	  concur	  with	  Tversky	  et	  al.’s	  conclusion	  about	  direct	  value	  
elicitation	  undervaluing	  the	  P-­‐bet.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  DV	  responses	  in	  Experiment	  
2	   also	   overvalued	   the	   P-­‐bet,	   although	   to	   a	   much	   lesser	   extent.	   There	   were	   57	  
participants	   for	  whom	  DV(P)	  <	   SI(P),	   4	   for	  whom	  DV(P)	  =	   SI(P)	   	   and	  123	   for	  whom	  
DV(P)	  >	  SI(P).	  So	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  sample	  gave	  median	  DVs	  than	  were	  strictly	  higher	  
than	  their	  SIs.	  The	  sample	  mean	  DV(P)	  based	  on	  individual	  medians	  was	  £8.87	  while	  
the	   sample	   mean	   SI(P)	   was	   £8.18,	   giving	   an	   average	   within-­‐person	   difference	   of	  
£0.69	  and	  quite	  firmly	  rejecting	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  (p	  
<	  0.01).	  Still,	  the	  degree	  of	  overvaluation	  was	  much	  reduced:	  the	  average	  DV(P)	  was	  
just	  8.4%	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  SI(P),	  as	  compared	  with	  the	  average	  DV($)	  being	  
2.8	   times	   the	   size	   of	   the	   average	   SI($).	   Clearly,	   the	   fact	   that	   so	   many	   people	  
overvalued	   the	   $-­‐bet	   to	   a	   much	   greater	   extent	   than	   they	   overvalued	   the	   P-­‐bet	  
greatly	   outweighed	  many	   of	   the	   cases	   where	   SI(P)	   >	   SI($)	   and	   produced	   the	   very	  
pronounced	  classic	  PR	  pattern	  reported	  in	  Table	  5	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  ‘strong’	  
reversals.	  
Although	  we	  cannot	  conduct	  the	  same	  within-­‐person	  analysis	  for	  the	  bets	  used	  
in	  Experiment	  1,	  we	   can	  undertake	   some	  between-­‐sample	   comparisons	   to	  provide	  
further	  relevant	  evidence.	  	  
When	  asked	   to	  make	   repeated	  BCs	  between	  different	   sure	  amounts	   and	  $	  =	  
(£40,	   0.3),	   the	  101	  participants	   in	   Experiment	  1	   generated	  a	   sample	  mean	   SI($)	   of	  
£7.22.	  This	  compares	  with	  a	  sample	  mean	  of	  £15.74	  based	  on	  the	  individual	  median	  
DV($)	  responses	  of	  the	  184	  participants	  in	  Experiment	  2	  –	  again,	  more	  than	  double	  
the	  SI-­‐based	  figure.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  very	  strongly	  rejected	  (p	  <	  
0.001).	  
For	   P	   =	   (£15,	   0.7),	   the	   differences	   are	   smaller,	  with	   the	   sample	  mean	   of	   DV	  




so	  that	  the	  DV-­‐based	  figure	  is	  about	  12%	  higher.	  This	  difference	  registers	  as	  clearly	  
significant	  (p	  <	  0.01),	  once	  again	  suggesting	  that	  direct	  valuation	  also	  overvalues	  the	  
P-­‐bet	  relative	  to	  binary	  choice,	  albeit	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  than	  it	  overvalues	  the	  $-­‐bet.	  
So	  if	  we	  were	  to	  infer	  preferences	  from	  median	  DV	  responses,	  we	  should	  suppose	  $	  
to	  be	  preferred	  to	  P	  by	  82%	  of	  the	  184	  participants	  in	  Experiment	  2;	  whereas	  on	  the	  
basis	   of	   the	   SIs	   in	   Experiment	   1,	   $	   was	   preferred	   to	   P	   by	   fewer	   than	   18%	   of	  
participants.	   Such	   a	   large	   difference	   reinforces	   the	   suggestion	   of	   a	   substantial	  
disparity	  between	  DV-­‐	  and	  BC-­‐based	  preference	  elicitation	  methods.	  	  
Finally,	  from	  another	  81	  individuals	  in	  a	  separate	  part	  of	  Experiment	  1	  focusing	  
on	  the	  independence	  axiom,	  we	  have	  SI	  values	  for	  R	  =	  (£40,	  0.8;	  0,	  0.2),	  the	  fifth	  bet	  
for	  which	  we	  elicited	  four	  DVs	  from	  each	  participant	  in	  Experiment	  2.	  The	  81	  sets	  of	  
BC	   responses	   give	   a	   sample	  mean	   SI(R)	   of	   £25.12,	   compared	  with	   a	   sample	  mean	  
DV(R)	   of	   £29.02	   based	   on	   the	   184	   median	   DVs.	   Here,	   for	   a	   bet	   that	   can	   also	   be	  
regarded	   as	   a	   P-­‐bet,	   the	   sample	   mean	   of	   the	   median	   DVs	   is	   16%	   higher,	   an	  
overvaluation	  which	  is	  again	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level.	  
To	   summarise	   so	   far,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   whatever	   process	   generates	   DV	  
responses	   is	   a	   significantly	   different	   process	   from	   the	   one	   that	   produces	   BC	  
responses.	  The	  question	  then	  is:	  what	  can	  our	  data	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  DV	  process?	  
We	   have	   seen	   (footnote	   14)	   that	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   a	   small	   number	   of	  
individuals	  who	  give	  extreme	  responses	  and	  a	  similarly	  small	  number	  who	  apply	  an	  
expected	  value	   rule,	   the	  great	  majority	  display	   some	  variability	   in	   their	   set	  of	   four	  
responses	  per	  bet.	  This	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  compatible	  with	  DVs	  being	  produced	  by	  
some	   internal	   ‘production’	   process	   which	  may	   be	   different	   from	   the	   process	   that	  
produces	  BCs	  but	  which	  may	  exhibit	  its	  own	  within-­‐task	  regularity.	  
As	  mentioned	   in	   subsection	  2.3	   above,	   one	  way	  of	  modelling	   such	  a	  process	  
has	   been	   suggested	   by	   Johnson	   and	   Busemeyer	   (2005),	   applying	   Decision	   Field	  
Theory	   to	  direct	  valuation	   tasks.	  They	  propose	   that	   individuals	   can	  be	  modelled	  as	  
arriving	   at	   their	   value	   responses	   by	  means	   of	   a	   Sequential	   Value	  Matching	   (SVM)	  
process.	   In	  essence,	  they	  propose	  that	  it	   is	  as	  if	  an	  individual	  starts	  by	  comparing	  a	  
particular	  lottery	  with	  some	  initial	  sure	  amount;	  then	  adjusts	  that	  sure	  amount	  up	  or	  
down	   depending	   on	   whether	   the	   lottery	   seems	   clearly	   preferable	   or	   whether	   the	  
sure	  amount	  seems	  clearly	  preferable;	  and	  repeats	  this	  internal	  iteration	  until	  he/she	  
comes	  to	  a	  sure	  sum	  such	  that	   it	   is	  hard	  to	   identify	  a	  preference	  for	  one	  option	  or	  
the	  other,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  process	  is	  terminated	  and	  that	  sure	  sum	  is	  stated	  as	  the	  
value.	  
In	  an	  example	  they	  give,	  Johnson	  and	  Busemeyer	  (2005)	  take	  the	  initial	  value	  
to	  be	  halfway	  between	   the	   two	  payoffs	  of	  a	  bet.	   For	  P-­‐bets	   this	   is	  a	   relatively	   low	  
figure	  (in	  our	  Experiment	  2,	  halfway	  between	  £12	  and	  0	  –	  i.e.	  £6)	  while	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet	  
it	  is	  much	  higher	  (in	  our	  Experiment	  2,	  it	  would	  be	  £25).	  The	  stochastic	  nature	  of	  the	  
process	  means	  that	  iterations	  starting	  low	  and	  working	  up	  –	  as	  for	  P-­‐bets	  –	  are	  more	  




imprecision,	  whereas	  iterations	  starting	  high	  and	  coming	  down	  –	  as	  for	  $-­‐bets	  –	  are	  
more	   likely	   to	   end	   on	   the	   high	   side.	   This	   would	   produce	   the	   kind	   of	   result	   that	  
Tversky	  et	  al.	   reported,	  although	   it	  would	  not	  produce	   the	  result	  we	   found,	  where	  
the	   P-­‐bet	   was	   also	   overvalued	   somewhat.	   However,	   it	   might	   seem	   that	   we	   could	  
achieve	  our	  result	  if	  we	  modified	  Johnson	  and	  Busemeyer’s	  supposition	  –	  which	  was	  
more	  of	  a	  conjecture	  than	  a	  strong	  assumption	  –	  about	  the	  amount	  used	  to	  start	  the	  
iteration:	  if	  people	  actually	  start	  the	  iteration	  for	  both	  bets	  from	  the	  high	  payoff	  and	  
work	  down,	  the	  process	  could	  end	  with	  the	  P-­‐bet	  (coming	  down	  from	  £12)	  being	  a	  
little	   overvalued	   while	   the	   $-­‐bet	   (coming	   down	   from	   £50)	   could	   be	   much	   more	  
overvalued.	  This	   is	  more	   in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	   ‘anchoring	  and	   insufficient	  adjustment’	  
explanation	  suggested	  by	  Lichtenstein	  and	  Slovic	  (1971).	  
One	   implication	   of	   Johnson	   and	   Busemeyer’s	   model	   is	   that	   the	   valuation	  
process	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  binary	  choice	  process,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  after	  
the	   initial	   amount	  has	  been	  picked,	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   valuation	  procedure	   involves	   a	  
sequence	  of	  binary	  choices	  to	  determine	  the	  next	  step	  of	  the	  iteration.	  If	  that	  were	  
the	   case,	   one	   might	   suppose	   that	   the	   downward	   movement	   from	   any	   particular	  
initial	   value	  would	   be	   least	   for	   those	  with	   the	   highest	   SIs	   for	   a	   particular	   gamble,	  
since	  they	  will	  tend	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  top	  ends	  of	  their	  imprecision	  interval.	  Thus	  
we	  should	  expect	  that	  those	  with	  the	  highest	  SIs	  should	  also	  be	  the	  people	  giving	  the	  
highest	   DVs	   for	   that	   same	   gamble.	   So	   even	   if	   the	  magnitudes	   are	   rather	   different	  
between	  DV	  and	  SI,	  we	  should	  still	  observe	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  rank	  correlation	  between	  the	  
DVs	  and	  SIs	  for	  each	  gamble.	  
We	  can	  examine	  that	  hypothesis	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  the	  $-­‐bet	  and	  the	  P-­‐bet	  
in	  Experiment	  2.	  For	  the	  P-­‐bet,	  the	  Spearman	  rank	  correlation	  coefficient	  r	  =	  0.308	  (p	  
<	  0.01)	  while	  for	  the	  $-­‐bet,	  r	  =	  0.165	  (p	  <	  0.05).	   	  Thus	  the	  relationship	  is	  significant	  
and	  in	  the	  right	  direction;	  but	  each	  r	  is	  rather	  modest,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  $-­‐
bet.	  	  
To	   provide	   some	   comparability,	   consider	   an	   alternative	   possibility:	   namely,	  
that	  the	  mental	  process	  used	  to	  generate	  DV	  responses	  is	  rather	  different	  from	  the	  
mental	  process	  used	  to	  generate	  BCs,	  but	  each	  mental	  process	   is	  applied	  to	  similar	  
bets	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  internally	  consistent.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  
see	  rather	  higher	  degrees	  of	  correlation	  between	  the	  DVs	  for	  the	  two	  $-­‐bets	  and	  also	  
between	  the	  DVs	  for	  the	  three	  P-­‐bets	  in	  Experiment	  2	  than	  between	  DVs	  and	  SIs	  for	  
any	  particular	  bet.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  we	  find:	  for	  the	  two	  $-­‐bets,	  r	  =	  0.915	  (p	  <	  0.001);	  
while	  for	  the	  two	  P-­‐bets	  which	  are	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  two	  experiments,	  r	  =	  0.846	  
(p	  <	  0.001).	  The	  third	  P-­‐bet	  has	  an	  expected	  value	  more	  than	  three	  times	  as	  large	  as	  
the	  other	  two,	  but	  still	  the	  rank	  correlation	  is	  reasonably	  high:	  r	  =	  0.725	  (p	  <	  0.001)	  
for	  the	  comparison	  with	  the	  P-­‐bet	  from	  Experiment	  1;	  and	  r	  =	  0.771	  (p	  <	  0.001)	  for	  
the	  comparison	  with	  the	  P-­‐bet	  from	  Experiment	  2.	  
So	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   high	   level	   of	   regularity	   within	   the	   DV	   task	   when	  




we	   compare	   a	   $-­‐bet	  with	   a	   P-­‐bet	   –	   the	   correlations	   become	   considerably	  weaker.	  
This	   would	   seem	   to	   speak	   against	   a	   very	   simple	   ‘anchoring	   and	   insufficient	  
adjustment’	  model,	  whereby	  individuals	  start	  from	  the	  high	  payoff	  and	  then	  discount	  
by	  some	  factor	  that	  is	  roughly	  proportional	  to	  –	  but	  understates	  –	  the	  probability	  of	  
zero.	  Were	   such	   discount	   factors	   to	   be	   personal	   characteristics	   that	   vary	   between	  
individuals	   but	   are	   applied	   more	   or	   less	   consistently	   to	   different	   bets,	   we	   should	  
expect	   a	   good	   degree	   of	   rank	   correlation	   across	   {$,	   P}	   pairs.	   There	   is	   a	   significant	  
positive	  rank	  correlation	  for	  these	  pairs,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  lower	  than	  between	  $-­‐
bets	  or	  between	  P-­‐bets:	  for	  the	  median	  DVs	  for	  the	  {$,	  P}	  pair	  from	  Experiment	  1,	  r	  =	  
0.405	  (p	  <	  0.001);	  for	  the	  {$,	  P}	  pair	  from	  Experiment	  2,	  r	  =	  0.282	  (p	  <	  0.001).	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  compute	  for	  each	  individual	  the	  difference	  between	  
median	   DV($)	   and	   median	   DV(P)	   in	   Experiment	   2	   and	   compare	   it	   with	   the	  
corresponding	  within-­‐person	  difference	  for	  the	  {$,	  P}	  pair	  in	  Experiment	  1,	  we	  again	  
find	  a	  very	  high	  correlation,	  with	  r	  =	  0.889	  (p	  <	  0.001):	  that	   is,	  those	  who	  state	  the	  
biggest	  differences	  in	  direct	  valuations	  between	  $	  and	  P	  for	  one	  pair	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  
be	  reporting	  the	  biggest	  differences	  for	  the	  other	  pair.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  ranking	  
of	   individuals	   according	   to	   their	   expressed	   difference	   between	  DV($)	   and	   DV(P)	   is	  
completely	  uncorrelated	  with	   their	   ranking	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  difference	  between	  
SI($)	  and	  SI(P),	  with	  r	  =	  0.005	  (p	  =	  0.945),	  lending	  even	  more	  force	  to	  the	  conclusion	  
that	  valuations	  are	  not	  simply	  some	  modified	  form	  of	  iterative	  choice	  procedure,	  but	  
invoke	   rather	   different	   cognitive	   processes	   –	   although	   we	   cannot	   yet	   offer	   an	  




6.	  Concluding	  Remarks:	  Some	  Challenges	  for	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  
	  
Most	   theories	   of	   decision	   making	   under	   risk	   and	   uncertainty	   are	   presented	   as	  
deterministic	   models	   with	   general	   applicability	   across	   all	   types	   of	   decision	   task	  
including	  choice	  and	  valuation.15	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  actual	  behaviour	  exhibits	  some	  
degree	   of	   variability,	   this	   is	   often	   represented	   in	   terms	   of	   some	   error	   term	   or	  
stochastic	   specification	   external	   to	   the	   deterministic	   core.	   Such	   models	   allow	   the	  
possibility	   of	   seemingly	   systematic	   departures	   from	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  
deterministic	  core,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  degree,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Section	  3.	  	  
                                                
15 Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and its more widely applied successor, Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) are exceptions in this respect. Prospect Theory was 
formulated explicitly only as a theory of choice. When it came to deriving certainty equivalents as part 
of the process of estimating parameters for Cumulative Prospect Theory, the authors were careful to 
arrive at those certainty equivalents via a choice-based procedure rather than by a direct elicitation – a 
point which they emphasise on p. 306 of the 1992 paper. However, the structure of Cumulative 
Prospect Theory entails the existence of certainty equivalents and many subsequent authors have 




By	   asking	   individuals	   to	   make	   repeated	   binary	   choices	   covering	   a	   range	   of	  
values	  (and,	  in	  Experiment	  2,	  repeated	  direct	  valuations),	  we	  sought	  to	  engage	  with	  
the	  probabilistic	  nature	  of	  observed	  decisions.	  We	  thereby	  obtained	  estimates	  of	  SIs	  
and	   median	   DVs	   which	   allowed	   us	   to	   examine	   the	   extent	   of	   within-­‐task	   and	  
between-­‐task	  conformity	  with	  standard	  core	  assumptions.	  
In	   two	   separate	  experiments	  using	   two	  different,	  but	   typical,	   {$,	  P}	  pairs,	  we	  
found	  substantial	  –	  although	  not	  total	  –	  conformity	  with	  Weak	  Stochastic	  Transitivity	  
within	  the	  domain	  of	  binary	  choice.	  To	  the	  degree	  that	  we	  found	  violations	  of	  WST,	  
they	   were	   systematically	   in	   the	   direction	   consistent	   with	   ‘classic’	   preference	  
reversals;	   but	   these	   only	   accounted	   for	   7%-­‐10%	   of	   all	   participants,	   and	   the	  
magnitudes	  of	   the	  disparities	  were	  quite	  small.	  The	  usual	  extent	  of	   the	  preference	  
reversal	  phenomenon	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  choice-­‐valuation	  analogue	  
of	  such	  intransitivity.	  
Nor	   can	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   be	   explained	   by	   adding	   external	  
noise	  to	  a	  transitive	  core	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  equally	  well	  to	  choice	  and	  valuation.	  If	  
it	  were	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  such	  noise,	  the	  effect	  should	  be	  greatly	  attenuated,	  if	  not	  
completely	  eliminated,	  by	  working	  with	  the	  medians	  extracted	  from	  the	  distributions	  
of	  response	  elicited	  by	  repeated	  presentation	  of	  each	  task.	  However,	  despite	  trying	  
to	  control	  any	  obvious	   framing	  effects	  by	   formulating	   the	  DV	   tasks	   in	  a	   choice-­‐like	  
manner	   and	   interspersing	   the	   DV	   tasks	   among	   the	   BC	   tasks	   in	   order	   to	   allow	  
participants	  every	  opportunity	  to	  process	  them	  on	  a	  comparable	  basis,	  the	  response	  
patterns	  were	  very	  different	  and	  produced	  a	  strong	  pattern	  of	  the	  classic	  kind.	  	  
It	  is	  this	  result	  which	  poses	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  for	  decision	  modelling.	  While	  
it	  might	  be	  true	  that	  a	  few	  respondents	  may	  not	  fully	  understand	  the	  DV	  task	  and/or	  
the	   implications	   of	   the	   Becker-­‐DeGroot-­‐Marschak	   incentive	  mechanism,	   it	   is	   clear	  
that	   this	   is	  not	   the	  main	  source	  of	   the	  disparity.	  The	  DV	  responses	  exhibited	  some	  
within-­‐person	  variability,	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part	  this	  was	  modest	  and	  the	  correlation	  
between	  DV	   responses	   to	   similar	  bets	  was	  high.	  So	  participants	  were	   for	   the	  most	  
part	  responding	  to	  the	  DV	  tasks	  in	  ways	  that	  showed	  reasonable	  internal	  consistency	  
and	  coherence,	  but	  that	  were	  markedly	  and	  systematically	  different	  from	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  those	  same	  people	  responded	  to	  the	  BC	  tasks.	  	  
One	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  variability	  observed	  in	  this	  and	  many	  other	  
experiments	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   cognitive	   processes	   that	   are	   inherently	   subject	   to	  
stochastic	  effects.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  perceptual	  decisions,	  such	  processes	  have	  been	  
modelled	  as	  sequential	  sampling	  /	  accumulation	  of	  evidence	  (see	  Otter	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  
for	   a	   review).	   Busemeyer	   and	   Townsend’s	   (1993)	  Decision	   Field	   Theory	   is	   an	   early	  
example	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  being	  applied	  to	  preference	  tasks	  where	  decisions	  are	  
seen	  as	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  deliberative	  process.	  A	  possible	  corollary	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  
model	   is	   that	   different	   types	   of	   task	   may	   invoke	   somewhat	   different	  
sampling/accumulation	  processes	  in	  ways	  which	  generate	  patterns	  of	  response	  that	  




to	  be	  made	  from	  one	  task	  type	  to	  another.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  no	  deterministic	  theory	  
which	  claims	  to	  apply	  generally	  across	  task	  type	  and	  irrespective	  of	  other	  contextual	  
factors	   is	   likely	   to	   succeed	   descriptively.	   This	   poses	   the	   challenge	   of	   developing	  
models	   which	   help	   us	   to	   understand	   procedural	   effects	   as	   part	   of	   the	   fabric	   of	  
decision	  making,	  perhaps	  enabling	  us	  to	  make	  appropriate	  allowances	  for	  them.	  
It	   also	   poses	   a	   challenge	   for	   practical	   and	   policy	   applications.	   Cost-­‐benefit	  
analyses	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   health,	   safety	   or	   environmental	   protection,	   for	   example,	  
may	   elicit	   values	   for	   non-­‐marketed	   goods	   through	   surveys	   and	   use	   such	   values	   to	  
guide	   resource	   allocation	   policy	   in	   those	   areas.	   The	   most	   straightforward	   way	   of	  
obtaining	   such	   values	   may	   be	   to	   ask	   directly	   for	   individuals’	   monetary	   valuations	  
(their	   ‘willingness	   to	   pay’)	   for	   the	   goods	   in	   question.	   However,	   if	   the	   preference	  
orderings	   inferred	   from	   individuals’	   direct	   valuation	   responses	   do	   not	   reflect	   the	  
choices	  they	  would	  make,	  we	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  such	  values.	  
If	   we	   want	   values	   that	   more	   reliably	   reflect	   the	   choices	   people	   make,	   the	  
method	   used	   in	   this	   study,	   while	   suitable	   for	   our	   experimental	   investigation	   of	  
probabilistic	   choice,	   is	   not	   likely	   to	   be	   practicable	   for	   general	   surveys.	   For	   such	  
purposes,	   we	   would	   need	   techniques	   that	   can	   be	   administered	   more	   quickly.	  
However,	   the	   speed	  and	   convenience	  of	   such	  methods	  may	   come	  at	   some	   cost	   in	  
terms	  of	  accuracy	  or	  susceptibility	  to	  bias.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  point,	  we	  briefly	  consider	  
three	  candidate	  techniques.	  
PEST	   (Parameter	   Estimation	   by	   Sequential	   Testing)	   is	   an	   iterative	   choice	  
algorithm	   that	  was	   used	   by	   Bostic	  et	   al.	   (1990)	   in	   their	   second	   experiment	   to	   see	  
whether	  preference	  reversals	  would	  diminish	  or	  disappear	  when	  values	  were	  derived	  
from	   choices.	   In	   their	   first	   experiment	   they	   used	   a	   simpler	   and	  more	   transparent	  
iterative	  procedure	   to	  arrive	  at	  CEs	   for	  each	  bet.	  However,	   for	   two	  of	   the	   four	  bet	  
pairs	   they	   studied,	   the	   usual	   PR	   asymmetry	   persisted	   to	   a	   significant	   extent.	  
Suspecting	   that	   this	  might	   in	  part	  be	  attributable	   to	   respondents	   realising	   that	   the	  
choice	   iterations	  were	   aimed	   at	   eliciting	   values	   and	   thus	   being	   prompted	   to	   think	  
more	  in	  direct	  valuation	  terms,	  Bostic	  et	  al.	  (1990)	  used	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  PEST	  
procedure,	   alternating	   each	   step	   with	   an	   unrelated	   filler	   question	   to	   disguise	   the	  
algorithm.	  This	  less	  transparent	  procedure	  further	  reduced	  the	  PR	  asymmetry.	  More	  
recently,	   the	   PEST	   method	   and	   another	   opaque	   iterative	   process	   were	   used	   by	  
Sanchez	   Martinez	   et	   al.	   (2015)	   in	   the	   context	   of	   health	   state	   evaluation	   where	  
‘matching’	  methods	  led	  to	  estimates	  which	  diverged	  significantly	  from	  binary	  choices	  
but	  where	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  concealed	  iterative	  methods	  produced	  equivalences	  
much	  more	  in	  line	  with	  choices.	  Although	  further	  work	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  more	  
broadly	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  concealed	  iterative	  choice	  procedures	  compared	  
with	  the	  kind	  of	  random	  binary	  choice	  method	  used	  in	  our	  study,	  it	  may	  turn	  out	  that	  
some	   form	  of	  disguised	   iteration	   could	  be	  a	   feasible	  option	  –	  although	   it,	   too,	  will	  
often	  entail	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  number	  of	  choices,	  once	  allowance	  has	  been	  made	  for	  the	  




Another	   method	   that	   might	   be	   used	   to	   elicit	   equivalences	   involves	   multiple	  
price/choice	   lists	   (MPLs).	   The	   general	   principle	   here	   is	   to	   construct	   a	   table	  where	  
each	   row	   is	  a	  binary	  choice	  and	  where	   the	  balance	  between	   the	  options	  on	  either	  
side	  of	  the	  table	  changes	  progressively	  as	  we	  move	  up	  or	  down	  the	  list.	  For	  example,	  
Cohen	  et	  al.	  (1987)	  asked	  respondents	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  lottery	  which	  was	  kept	  
fixed	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  table,	  with	  the	  options	  on	  the	  other	  side	  involving	  21	  sure	  
amounts	  of	  money	  which	  increased	  from	  one	  row	  to	  the	  next.	  The	  point	  at	  which	  a	  
respondent	  switched	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  table	  to	  the	  other	  was	  taken	  to	   indicate	  
the	   location	   of	   that	   individual’s	   CE	   for	   the	   lottery.	   A	   little	   later,	   Tversky	   and	  
Kahneman	  (1992,	  pp.	  305-­‐306)	  used	  a	  two-­‐stage	  list	  procedure	  to	  help	  them	  derive	  
their	  probability	  weighting	   function.	  More	   recently,	  Holt	  and	  Laury	   (2002)	  adapted	  
the	   list	   approach,	   keeping	   all	   payoffs	   constant	   while	   progressively	   changing	   the	  
probabilities	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   table	   so	   as	   to	   entail	   a	   single	   switching	   point	  
intended	  to	  provide	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  individual’s	  attitude	  to	  risk.	  
The	  advantage	  of	   the	  MPL	  method	   is	   that	   it	   is	  quite	  quick	   to	  administer	   and	  
relatively	  straightforward	  to	  analyse	  as	  long	  as	  respondents	  do	  not	  switch	  from	  side	  
to	   side	  more	   than	   once	   per	   table	   and	   as	   long	   as	   one	   assumes	   that	   the	   switching	  
point	  corresponds	  with	  the	  SI	  point.16	  One	  disadvantage	  is	  that	  responses	  appear	  to	  
be	   susceptible	   to	   various	   systematic	   framing	   effects	   connected	   to	   the	   ranges	   and	  
frequencies	  selected	  by	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  order	   in	  which	  rows	  are	  presented.	  
Parducci	   (1965)	   provides	   an	   early	   discussion	   of	   range-­‐frequency	   effects;	   Levy-­‐
Garboua	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  Loomes	  and	  Pogrebna	  (2014b)	  report	  such	  effects	  in	  tables	  
intended	  to	  elicit	  risk	  attitudes;	  and	  Sanchez	  Martinez	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  find	  evidence	  of	  
such	  effects	  in	  the	  context	  of	  health	  state	  evaluation.	  Of	  course,	  if	  decisions	  are	  the	  
result	  of	  some	  process	  of	  sampling	  and	  accumulation,	   it	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  to	  
find	   that	   ‘cues’	   provided	   by	   MPLs	   are	   liable	   to	   have	   various	   systematic	   effects.	  
Further	   investigation	  of	   the	  magnitude	  of	  such	  effects	  may	  be	  required	   in	  order	   to	  
make	   judgments	   about	   the	   appropriate	   trade-­‐off	   between	   ease	   of	   administration	  
and	  susceptibility	  to	  bias.	  
If	  we	  cannot	  ask	  each	  respondent	  to	  make	  a	  large	  number	  of	  choices	  and	  if	  the	  
transparency	   of	  more	   compact	   iterative/list	   procedures	  makes	   them	   vulnerable	   to	  
bias,	   a	   third	   approach	  may	   be	   considered	   for	   studies	  with	   large	   sample	   sizes.	   The	  
dichotomous	  choice	  method,	  as	  advocated	  by	  Arrow	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  in	  a	  report	  for	  the	  
National	  Oceanic	  and	  Atmospheric	  Administration,	  essentially	   involves	   identifying	  a	  
set	  of	  possible	  values	  and	  then	  asking	  each	  of	  a	  very	  large	  number	  of	  respondents	  to	  
make	   just	   one	   choice	   between	   the	   good	   under	   consideration	   and	   a	   single	   value	  
picked	  at	  random	  from	  the	  set.	  On	  this	  basis,	  an	  aggregate	  ‘bid	  function’	  is	  derived,	  
                                                
16 In fact, it is common for a minority of respondents to switch sides more than once, usually leading to 
the exclusion of their data. Moreover, if underlying preferences are indeed probabilistic, the assumption 




mapping	   from	   each	   value	   to	   the	   frequency	  with	  which	   the	   good	   is	   chosen	   by	   the	  
subsample	  of	  respondents	  presented	  with	  that	  value.	  
To	   illustrate	   with	   reference	   to	   our	   first	   experiment,	   suppose	   that	   instead	   of	  
asking	   101	   respondents	   each	   to	  make	   36	   choices	   –	   four	   choices	   at	   nine	   different	  
levels	   of	   sure	   amount	   –	   we	   had	   been	   able	   to	   recruit	   909	   individuals	   and	   allocate	  
them	  at	  random	  between	  each	  of	  the	  nine	  sure	  sums	  and	  ask	  each	  of	  them	  just	  once	  
to	   choose	   between	   that	   sum	   and	   a	   particular	   bet.	   Since	   each	   person	   only	   sees	   a	  
single	  sure	  amount	  and	  is	  unaware	  of	  the	  other	  amounts	  in	  the	  set,	  range-­‐frequency	  
effects	  are	  not	  in	  play;	  and	  since	  he	  makes	  a	  choice	  just	  once,	  he	  has	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  deliberate	  carefully	  and	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  given	  filler	  tasks	  to	  distract	  him	  from	  
previous	  choices.	  We	  might	  thereby	  arrive	  at	  data	  looking	  like	  Table	  1,	  showing	  the	  
frequency	  with	  which	  the	  bet	  is	  chosen	  at	  each	  level	  of	  sure	  sum.	  	  
Although	  we	  cannot	  infer	  any	  particular	  individual’s	  SI	  from	  such	  data,	  we	  can	  
at	   least	   identify	   the	   sample	  median	   and	   derive	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   sample	  mean.	  
Without	  knowing	  more	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  underlying	  probability	  distributions	  
from	  which	  each	  individual’s	  response	  is	  drawn,	  it	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  say	  just	  how	  well	  
the	  sample	  median	  or	  mean	  proxies	  the	  median	  or	  mean	  of	  individuals’	  SIs,	  but	  if	  we	  
concur	  with	  the	  evidence	  from	  this	  and	  previous	  studies	  that	  WST	  broadly	  holds	  and	  
if	   we	   have	   sufficiently	   large	   samples	   making	   dichotomous	   choices	   across	   a	   large	  
enough	  range	  of	  values,	  we	  may	  consider	  such	  estimates	  to	  be	  adequate	  for	  social	  
cost-­‐benefit	  purposes.	  Against	  that,	   the	  required	  sample	  sizes	  may	  make	  such	  data	  
expensive	   to	   acquire;	   and	   under	   some	   conditions,	   even	   single	   questions	   may	   be	  
subject	  to	  effects	  which	  distort	  the	  aggregate	  picture.17	  	  
In	  short,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  there	  is	  any	  one	  method	  that	  is	  entirely	  immune	  
to	  some	  kind	  of	  effect	  or	  influence	  from	  the	  way	  it	   is	  framed	  or	  presented.	  Indeed,	  
such	  effects	  may	  be	  unavoidable	  corollaries	  of	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  generate	  
decisions	   and	   cause	   them	   to	   take	   a	   probabilistic	   rather	   than	   a	   deterministic	   form.	  
Our	   study	   cannot	   itself	   resolve	   the	   issue	   of	   which	   method	   to	   apply	   under	   any	  
particular	  circumstances.	  However,	  our	  results	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  
trying	   to	   develop	   descriptive	   models	   which	   not	   only	   accommodate	   probabilistic	  
preferences	  but	  also	  provide	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  different	  
elicitation	  procedures	  interact	  with	  underlying	  preferences.	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